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ABSTRACT
As mobile phones become an increasingly critical part of our world, ensuring the security
and privacy of mobile applications (in short as apps) becomes increasingly important. For too
long, researchers have often tackled security in an attack-driven, ad hoc, and reactionary
manner with large manual efforts devoted by security analysts. In the efforts of making
security systems automated and systematic, multiple intelligent techniques, such as program
analysis and machine learning, have been introduced in the mobile security systems for better
security decision making. However, these intelligent techniques are originally proposed for
domains such as image recognition, Virtual Personal Assistants, and software testing without
considering the presence of adversaries.
In this dissertation, we present three main bodies of research on adversarial resiliency
of intelligent techniques used in mobile security systems. We first present how intelligent
techniques can be adapted for automated decision making in mobile security systems. Then
we investigate the possibility to design and implement systematic attack strategies that are
specifically adversarial to these newly-proposed intelligent techniques. Last, based on the
findings that the intelligent techniques are indeed susceptible to the adversarial attacks, we
develop techniques to further strengthen the adversarial resiliency of intelligent techniques
toward these adversarial attacks.
In particular, we use mobile malware detection as a representative of security systems
for our investigation. To show how a malware detection approach can be enhanced by
intelligent techniques such as machine learning and static program analysis, we propose
AppContext, an approach that identifies malware with 87.7% precision and 95% recall. To
show the possibility to attack intelligent techniques such as machine learning, we propose
MRV, an approach that automatically constructs more than hundreds of new malware
variants compromising state-of-the-art learning-based malware detectors. To strengthen
the adversarial resiliency against obfuscation techniques used by malware to confuse static
analysis, we propose EnMobile, which detects malware with substantially higher precision
and recall than four state-of-the-art approaches, namely Apposcopy, Drebin, MUDFLOW,
and AppContext.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The increasing popularity of smartphones has made them a target for malware. App
markets that distribute software (i.e., applications, in short as apps) to smartphones leverage
both automated and manual app analyses to detect malware (e.g., Google Bouncer [1] and
Apple App store [2]). To improve the effectiveness of app analysis, existing research proposes
approaches that extract features from apps and compare those features against predefined
sets of signatures or patterns of malicious or privacy-infringing behaviors, such as method
calls, permissions, and information flows [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Similar to PC malware, mobile malware has begun taking steps to evade detection by
camouflaging as benign apps [11]. For example, an app can hide malicious intentions by
using APIs that are appropriate for its expected functionality. As another example, an
app may present itself as a messaging app that sends SMS messages when the user clicks
the “send” button. However, it also sends SMS messages containing the user’s contact
information in the background without notifying the user. Since both of these apps use the
same SMS APIs, existing automated tools that consider method calls and information flows
are unlikely to distinguish between these cases. Notably, the key difference between these
two apps is that the malicious app uses the SMS APIs under an unexpected context.
In this dissertation, we present three main bodies of research on adversarial resiliency
of intelligent techniques used in mobile security systems. We first present how intelligent
techniques can be adapted for automated decision making in mobile security systems. Then
we investigate the possibility to design and implement systematic attack strategies that are
specifically adversarial to these newly-proposed intelligent techniques. Last, based on the
findings that the intelligent techniques are indeed susceptible to the adversarial attacks, we
develop techniques to further strengthen the adversarial resiliency of intelligent techniques
toward these adversarial attacks.
This dissertation showcases the three main bodies of research on a specific problem:
using contextual information in the mobile system to automate security decision making.
Contextual information is information used to describe the contexts of a security-sensitive
behavior (e.g., who initiate the behavior, when the behavior happens, what factor controls
the triggering of the behavior). The motivation to use contextual information in making
security decision is to improve the usability of the security system. We want to automate the
security decision making rather than bothering the user every time when security-sensitive
behaviors occur.
The first observation that we have on this problem is that malicious behaviors may share
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the same security-sensitive operations as benign behaviors, and the differentiating factors
to distinguish malware and benign apps are the contexts under which the security-sensitive
operations happen. Chapter 3 (AppContext) illustrates our malware detection techniques
and findings based on such observation.
In Chapter 3, we identify contexts as differentiating features and present a technique to
extract contexts. However, we do not know which context feature can distinguish malware
from benign apps. In AppContext, we feed all context feature values as feature vectors to
train a machine learning model and the resulting machine learning model is used to decide
which feature vector corresponds to malware.
In Chapter 4 (EnMobile), we take an alternative route to extract contexts and leverage
the extracted contexts. We recognize entities in external environments of an app, and the
app’s interactions with such entities, as the key to comprehensively characterizing contexts
of security-sensitive behaviors in mobile apps. We develop an entity-based static analysis
to precisely extract such contexts. Then, to leverage contexts in detecting malware, instead
of using a machine learning model, we propose a signature language that characterizes an
app’s interactions with external entities, and compile a malware signature for each malware
family to detect malware.
After using both learning-based techniques and signature-based techniques to capture dis-
tinguishing context features, we come to question the robustness of the proposed approach.
We make our second observation: a context-based detection system could identify the dif-
ferentiating contexts between current malware and benign apps. However, some of the iden-
tified differentiating contexts might not be robust. Malware authors can easily change these
contexts while maintaining malicious behaviors. We name these contexts as differentiating
features but inessential features for malicious behaviors.
Contexts can be differentiating features but inessential features for many reasons. For
example, malware payloads usually copy/paste code from one payload to another. By doing
so, although a machine learning model could identify that some specific patterns occur in
malware much more often than in benign apps. These patterns are there only due to the
copy-paste practices but being inessential for malicious behaviors. Chapter 5 introduces
MRV, which leverages such observation and develops two major attacks to automatically
mutate malware to evade existing malware detection.
1.1 THESIS STATEMENT
The thesis statement is three-pronged:
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• (1) Adopting intelligent techniques in existing mobile security systems can enhance the
accuracy of security decision making.
• (2) It is possible to design and implement systematic attack strategies that are specifically
adversarial to these newly-proposed intelligent techniques.
• (3) It is possible to further strengthen the adversarial resiliency of intelligent techniques
toward these adversarial attacks.
In this dissertation, we first investigate how intelligent techniques can be adapted for au-
tomated decision making in a mobile security system. Specifically, we propose an approach,
AppContext, to detect malware based on the insight that the context of a security-sensitive
behavior is a strong indicator of the maliciousness of the behavior. AppContext includes a
static-analysis technique for context extraction, which accurately identifies activation condi-
tions and guarding conditions for security-sensitive behaviors, and an abstraction to model
the contexts of security-sensitive behaviors based on the two unique characteristics of mal-
ware (activation conditions and guarding conditions). AppContext uses machine learning
techniques to further leverage the extracted context features to detect malware.
Then, to investigate the possibility to systematically attack existing intelligent techniques,
we propose Malware Recomposition Variation (MRV), which includes two practical attacks
(feature evolution attack and feature confusion attack) to effectively mutate existing malware
for evading detection. We develop a transplantation framework capable of inter-method,
inter-component, and inter-app transplantation to automatically mutate app features. We
evaluate the robustness of detection models and the differentiability of selected features of
malware detectors by systematically and automatically applying proposed attacks to existing
malware detectors. We also propose and evaluate three defense mechanisms to strengthen
the robustness of malware detectors against MRV attacks.
Last, to investigate the possibility to strengthen the adversarial resiliency of intelligent
techniques, we propose a static-analysis approach named EnMobile, to derive the entity-
based characterization by analyzing bytecode of a given app, including identifying entities
and entity references, extracting provenance information for flows, and matching against
signatures in the face of segmented flows. We identify malware interaction patterns with
entities and provenance information of the interactions as a corner stone of comprehensively
characterizing mobile malware, especially carefully-designed evasive malware. We also pro-
pose a novel signature-specification language, based on this characterization, that enables
security analysts to create robust, abstract specifications.
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1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
To confirm the thesis statement, this dissertation makes the following main contributions:
• The dissertation presents a new abstraction to model the contexts of security-sensitive
behaviors based on the two unique characteristics of malware (activation conditions and
guarding conditions). Such abstraction of the contexts should be detailed enough to re-
flect the intentions of security-sensitive behaviors, but not too redundant to include all the
low-level detailed information about system states. Our context definition is based on the
observation that activating conditions (e.g., events triggering the execution of payloads)
and guarding conditions (e.g., environmental attributes controlling the execution of pay-
loads) are the key elements of context information to differentiate malicious behaviors and
benign behaviors. Thus, we define the context for a security-sensitive behavior as a tuple
containing an activation events (the event that triggers the security-sensitive behavior),
and a series of context factors (environmental attributes controlling the execution of the
security-sensitive behavior).
• The dissertation introduces a novel approach for malware detection, AppContext, which
statically analyzes the security-sensitive behaviors in an Android app. To extract activa-
tion events, AppContext chains all inter-component communications (ICCs) [12] within
the app and constructs an extended call graph (ECG) to infer activation events. To com-
pute context factors, AppContext combines the control flows of all components from entry
points triggered by activation events to the method calls that trigger security-sensitive
behaviors in a reduced inter-procedure control flow graph (RICFG) [13], and leverages in-
formation flow analysis [14] to identify the environmental attributes that affect the control
flows.
• The dissertation presents entity-based characterization of mobile app behaviors. Such
characterization summarizes malware interaction patterns with entities and provenance
information of the interactions; such characterization is a corner stone of comprehensively
characterizing mobile malware. Introducing the concept of entity allows security analysts
to express entity interactions in an end-to-end fashion, making it much more independent
of specific realizations of that interaction, and hence more robust. We also propose a
novel signature-specification language, based on this characterization, that enables secu-
rity analysts to create robust, abstract specifications. Security analysts can specify an
information flow by just using the two end-point entities without enumerating all possible
intermediate-point entities (e.g., files, databases).
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• The dissertation introduces the first approach that conducts semantic analysis of existing
malware to systematically construct new malware variants for malware detectors to test
and strengthen their detection signatures/models. In particular, we use two variation
strategies (i.e., malware evolution attack and malware confusion attack) following struc-
tures of existing malware to enhance feasibility of the attacks. Upon the given malware,
we conduct semantic-feature mutation analysis and phylogenetic analysis to synthesize
mutation strategies. Based on these strategies, we perform program transplantation to
automatically mutate malware bytecode to generate new malware variants.
1.3 DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
The main parts of this dissertation are organized as follows.
Chapter 2. Background. This chapter introduces three main types of security threats
in mobile apps and related techniques in addressing corresponding security issues.
Chapter 3. Differentiating Malicious and Benign Mobile App Behaviors Using
Context. This chapter introduces AppContext, an approach of static program analysis that
extracts the contexts of security-sensitive behaviors to assist app analysis in differentiating
between malicious and benign behaviors.
Chapter 4. Adversarial-resilient Static Analysis: Entity-based Characteriza-
tion and Analysis of Mobile Apps. This chapter introduces EnMobile, which includes
new characterization of mobile-app behaviors and entity-based static analyses to accurately
characterize an app’s interactions with entities.
Chapter 5. Malware Detection in Adversarial Settings: Exploiting Feature
Evolutions and Confusions in Mobile Apps. This chapter introduces Malware Re-
composition Variation (MRV), an approach that conducts semantic analysis of existing mal-
ware to systematically construct new malware variants for malware detectors to test and
strengthen their detection signatures/models.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
Along with the boom of Android apps come severe security challenges. Existing techniques
fall short when facing emerging security problems in Android apps, such as zero-day or
polymorphic malware, deep and complex vulnerabilities, and untrustworthy app descriptions.
To fight against these threats, we propose a semantics/context-aware approach, and design
and develop a series of advanced techniques.
2.1 SECURITY THREATS IN MOBILE APPS
Android has dominated the smartphone market and become the most popular operating
system for mobile devices. In the meantime, security threats in Android apps have also
quickly increased. In particular, four major classes of problems, malware, program vul-
nerabilities, privacy leaks, and insecure app descriptions, bring considerable challenges to
Android app security. Although a lot of research efforts have been made to address these
threats, they have fundamental limitations and thus cannot solve the problems.
2.1.1 Malware Attacks
Malware steals and pollutes sensitive information, executes attacker-specified commands,
or even totally roots and subverts the mobile devices. To fight against malware, a signature-
based approach extracts malicious behaviors as signatures (such as bytecode or regular
expression) while a more complicated machine-learning-based approach learns discriminant
features from analyzing semantics of malware. Unfortunately, existing automated approaches
for Android malware detection and classification can be evaded both in theory and practice.
One major challenge for both signature-based approaches and learning-based approaches
is to form an informative feature set for the signature or detection model. To address
the challenge, existing approaches of malware detection tend to include as many features
as possible. For example, Drebin [15], a recent approach of malware detection, uses the
feature set containing 545,334 features. A recent study [16] shows that such large feature
set has numerous non-informative or even misleading features. The extracted features are
thus associated with volatile application syntax, rather than high-level and robust program
semantics. As a result, these approaches are also susceptible to evasion.
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2.1.2 Software Vulnerabilities
Apps may also contain security vulnerabilities, such as privilege escalation [17], capabil-
ity leaks [6], permission re-delegation [18], component hijacking [19], and inter-component
communication vulnerabilities [12, 20, 21, 22]. These vulnerabilities are largely detected
via automatic static analysis [17, 18, 19, 12, 20, 21, 22] to guarantee the scalability and
satisfactory code coverage. However, static analysis is conservative in nature and may raise
false positives. Therefore, once a potential vulnerability is discovered, it first needs to be
confirmed; once it is confirmed, it then needs to be patched. Nevertheless, it is fairly chal-
lenging to programmatically accomplish these two tasks because there is a need of automated
interpretation of program semantics. So far, upon receiving a discovered vulnerability, the
developers have no choice but to manually confirm whether the reported vulnerability is
real. It may also be nontrivial for the (often inexperienced) developers to properly fix the
vulnerability and release a patch for it. Thus, these discovered vulnerabilities may not be
addressed for long time or not addressed at all, leaving a big time window for attackers to
exploit these vulnerabilities.
2.1.3 Untrustworthy Descriptions
Unlike traditional desktop systems, Android provides end users with an opportunity to
proactively accept or deny the installation of any app to the system. As a result, it is
essential that the users become aware of each app’s behaviors so as to make appropriate
decisions. To this end, Android markets directly present the consumers with two classes
of information regarding each app: (1) permissions requested by the app and (2) textual
descriptions provided by the developers. However, neither can serve the needs. Permissions
are not only hard to understand [18] but also incapable of explaining how the requested
permissions are used. For instance, both a benign navigation app and a spyware instance
of the same app can require the same permission to access GPS location, and yet use it for
completely different purposes. While the benign app delivers GPS data to a legitimate map
server upon the user’s approval, the spyware instance can periodically and stealthily leak the
user’s location information to an attacker’s site. Due to the lack of context clues, a user is not
able to perceive such differences via the simple permission enumeration. Textual descriptions
provided by developers are not security-centric. There exists very little incentive for app
developers to describe their products from a security perspective, and it is still a difficult
task for average developers to write dependable descriptions. Besides, malware authors
deliberately deliver misleading descriptions so as to hide malice from innocent users. Previous
7
studies [23, 24] have revealed that the existing descriptive texts are deviated considerably
from requested permissions. As a result, developer-driven description generation cannot be
considered trustworthy.
2.2 ANDROID MALWARE DETECTION
Existing automated approaches of Android malware detection and classification fall into
two general categories: (1) signature-based and (2) machine-learning-based. Signature-
based approaches [5, 25] look for specific patterns in the bytecode and API calls, but they
are easily evaded by bytecode-level transformation attacks [26]. Machine-learning-based
approaches [15, 27, 16, 28] extract features from an app’s behavior (such as permission
requests and critical API calls) and apply standard machine learning algorithms to perform
binary classification. Because the extracted features are associated with application syntax,
rather than program semantics, these detectors are also susceptible to evasion.
2.2.1 Signature-based Mobile Malware Detection and Analysis
Many of the existing Android anti-malware products use signature-based approaches for
malware detection. Signature-based approaches extract syntactic or semantic features [25]
to find signature(s) that matches with an existing database. DroidRanger [5] proposed
permission-based footprinting and heuristics-based schemes to detect new samples of known
malware families and identify certain behaviors of unknown malicious families, respectively.
Risk- Ranker [3] developed an automated system to uncover dangerous app behaviors, such
as root exploits and assess potential security risks. Signature-based approaches become
ineffective if variants of existing malware are generated through polymorphism.
2.2.2 Learning-based Mobile Malware Classification
Many efforts have also been made to automatically classify Android malware via machine
learning. Peng et al. [27] proposed a permission-based classification approach and introduced
probabilistic generative models for ranking risks for Android apps. Juxtapp [29] performed
feature hashing on the opcode sequence to detect malicious code reuse. DroidAPIMiner [30]
extracted Android malware features at the API level and provided light-weight classifiers to
defend against malware installations. DREBIN [15] took a hybrid approach and considered
both Android permissions and sensitive APIs as malware features. To this end, it performed
broad static analysis to extract feature sets from both manifest files and bytecode programs.
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It further embedded all feature sets into a joint vector space. As a result, the features
contributing to malware detection can be analyzed geometrically and used to explain the
detection results. Despite the effectiveness and computational efficiency, these machine-
learning-based approaches extract features from solely external symptoms and do not seek
an accurate and complete interpretation of app behaviors.
2.3 MOBILE APP VULNERABILITIES
Although the permission-based sandboxing mechanism enforced in Android can effectively
confine each app’s behaviors by only allowing the ones granted with corresponding permis-
sions, a vulnerable app with certain critical permissions can perform security-sensitive be-
haviors on behalf of a malicious app. It is so called confused deputy attack. Mobile security
vulnerabilities can present in numerous forms, such as privilege escalation [17], capabil-
ity leaks [6], permission re-delegation [18], component hijacking [19], and inter-component
communication vulnerabilities [12, 20, 21, 22].
Prior work primarily focused on automatic discovery of these vulnerabilities. Once a
vulnerability is discovered, it can be reported to the developers and a patch is expected.
Some patches can be as simple as placing a permission validation at the entry point of an
exposed interface (to defeat privilege escalation and permission re-delegation attacks), or
withholding the public access to the internal data repositories (to defend against content
leaks and pollution).
2.3.1 Component Hijacking Vulnerabilities
Component hijacking may fall into the latter category. When receiving a manipulated
input from a malicious Android app, an app with a component hijacking vulnerability may
exfiltrate sensitive information or tamper with the sensitive data in a critical data repository
on behalf of the malicious app. In other words, a dangerous information flow may happen
in either an outbound or inbound direction depending on certain external conditions and/or
the internal program state. A prior effort has been made to perform static analysis to
discover potential component hijacking vulnerabilities [19]. Static analysis is known to be
conservative in nature and may raise false positives. For instance, static analysis may find a
viable execution path for information flow, which may never be reached in actual program
execution; static analysis may find that interesting information is stored in some elements
in a database, and thus has to conservatively treat the entire database as sensitive. As a
result, upon receiving a discovered vulnerability, the developers have to manually confirm
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whether the reported vulnerability is real. However, it is nontrivial for average developers
to properly fix the vulnerability and release a patch.
2.3.2 Bytecode Rewriting
In principle, these aforementioned patching techniques can be leveraged to address the
vulnerabilities in Android apps. Nevertheless, to fix an Android app, a specific bytecode
rewriting technique is needed to insert patch code into the vulnerable programs. Previous
studies have utilized this technique to address various problems. I-ARM-Droid [31] rewrote
Dalvik bytecode to interpose on all the API invocations and enforce the desired security
policies. Aurasium [32] repackaged Android apps to sandbox important native APIs so as
to monitor security and privacy violations. Livshits and Jung [33] implemented a graph-
theoretic algorithm to place mediation prompts into bytecode program and thus protect
resource access. However, due the simplicity of the target problems, prior work did not
attempt to rewrite the bytecode programs in an extensive fashion. In contrast, to address
sophisticated vulnerabilities, such as component hijacking, a new machinery has to be devel-
oped, so that inserted patch code can effectively monitor and control sensitive information
flow in apps.
2.3.3 Instrumentation Code Optimization
The size of a rewritten program usually increases significantly. Thus, an optimization
phase is needed. Several prior studies attempted to reduce code instrumentation overhead
by performing various static analyses and optimizations. To find error patterns in Java
source code, Martin et al. [34] optimized dynamic instrumentation by performing static
pointer alias analysis. To detect numerous software attacks, Xu et al. [35] inserted runtime
checks to enforce various security policies in C source code, and remove redundant checks via
compiler optimizations. As a comparison, due to the limited resources on mobile devices,
there exists an even more strict restriction for app size. Therefore, a novel approach is
necessary to address this new challenge.
2.4 TEXT ANALYTICS FOR MOBILE SECURITY
Recently, efforts have been made to study the security implications of textual descriptions
for Android apps. WHYPER [23] used techniques of natural language processing to identify
the descriptive sentences that are associated to permissions. It implemented a semantic
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engine to connect textual elements to Android permissions. AutoCog [24] further applied
machine learning techniques to automatically correlate the app descriptions to permissions,
and therefore was able to assess description-to-permission fidelity of apps. These studies
demonstrate the urgent need to bridge the gap between the textual descriptions and security-
related program semantics.
2.4.1 Automated Generation of Natural Language Description
There exists a series of studies on software description generation for traditional Java
programs. Sridhara et al. [36] automatically summarized method syntax and function logic
using natural language. Later, a similar approach [37] was proposed to improve the method
summaries by also describing the specific roles of method parameters and integrating pa-
rameter descriptions. Such approach offered heuristics to generate comments and describe
the specific roles of different method parameters. A further approach [38] was proposed
to automatically identify high-level abstractions of actions in code and described them in
natural language. The approach can also identify code fragments that implement high-level
abstractions of actions and express them as a natural language description.
In the meantime, Buse and Weimer [39] leveraged symbolic execution and code summa-
rization techniques to document program differences, and thus synthesize succinct human-
readable documentation for arbitrary program differences. Moreno et al. [40] proposed a
summarization approach that determines class and method stereotypes and uses them, in
conjunction with heuristics, to select the information to be included in the class summaries.
The goal of these approaches is to improve the program comprehension for developers. As
a result, these approaches focused on documenting intra-procedural program logic and low-
level code structures. On the contrary, they did not aim at depicting high-level program
semantics and therefore could not help end users to understand the risk of Android apps.
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CHAPTER 3: DIFFERENTIATING MALICIOUS AND BENIGN MOBILE
APP BEHAVIORS USING CONTEXT
3.1 OVERVIEW
A fundamental difference between malicious and benign apps is that their design principles
are different. The principles guiding the design of benign apps are to meet requirements
from users. However, two basic principles [41] guide the design of most malware are to (1)
trigger the execution of their malicious payload (i.e., the part of malware carrying malicious
behaviors) frequently to seek maximal benefits; (2) evade detection to prolong their lifetime.
Guided by these principles, mobile malware leverages two major features of mobile platforms
as below.
Frequent occurrences of imperceptible system events. Unlike traditional software,
where events typically come from standard user inputs (keyboards and mice), a large portion
of behaviors in mobile apps are driven by events from the mobile system and its sensors [42].
Compared to UI-triggered events, which rely on the user to perform a specific sequence of
UI interactions in a specific app, system events are much more frequently triggered. Thus,
malware often leverages system events to increase the chances of invoking its malicious
payloads [4]. Moreover, system events can occur when the user is not using the app or
the device itself, malicious behaviors triggered by system events can easily evade the user’s
attentions, concealing the signs and traces of the malicious behaviors.
Informative external-environment states. Mobile apps can access numerous at-
tributes of the external environment (e.g., locations and system time). These attributes
often convey useful information about the current states of the environment. Such environ-
ment states are frequently exploited by malware to actively control the execution of malicious
behaviors. For example, the DroidDream [43] malware family suppresses its malicious be-
haviors during the day and invokes its malicious payload only at night. Since app reviewers
or automated tools, such as Bouncer [1], can analyze apps for only a short period of time
and with limited variations of environmental conditions, it is very likely that the reviewers
and the tools cannot detect the malware when the environmental conditions that trigger the
malicious behaviors are not met.
Based on the above-mentioned fundamental differences between malware and benign apps,
we propose that the context in which a security-sensitive behavior occurs is a strong indicator
of whether the security-sensitive behavior is malicious or benign. Malware executes its
malicious payloads only under certain unique contexts to reach a balance between prolonging
its life time and increasing the chance of being invoked. Such contexts are unique because
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a balance can be reached only when malicious behaviors are invoked frequently enough to
meet the needs (e.g., a certain number of clicks per day to improve search engine rankings
of a website), but not too frequently for reviewers/users or tools to notice the abnormal
behaviors of the app. On the contrary, most of the contexts for benign behaviors are user
interactive, and thus are exploited less frequently by malware.
Expressing contexts in mobile apps is a non-trivial task. In mobile apps, various elements
could be used to describe the contexts in which security-sensitive behaviors occur. However,
due to the complex event-driven nature of mobile apps, expressing the contexts using all the
factors determining the invocation of security-sensitive behaviors would incur huge overhead
in extracting the context information and extra burden in differentiating benign behaviors
from malicious ones. Consider the example that a security-sensitive behavior can occur only
when an app component enters into the lifecycle method that invokes the behavior. Android
apps are component-based and each component has a lifecycle [44]. Any factor changing the
component’s state will determine the invocation of the lifecycle method, thus determining the
invocation of the security-sensitive behavior. Since there are a large number of these factors,
such as messages sent by other components, remote procedure calls by other components,
UI operations of users, and system events, incorporating all these factors into the definition
of context would make the analysis for extracting contexts expensive and bring noisy data
in differentiating benign behaviors from malicious ones.
To express contexts concisely and yet capture the essence to reflect intentions, we propose
an abstraction of the contexts. Such abstraction of the contexts should be detailed enough to
reflect the intentions of security-sensitive behaviors, but not too redundant to include all the
low-level detailed information about system states. Our context definition is based on the
observation that activating conditions (e.g., events triggering the execution of payloads) and
guarding conditions (e.g., environmental attributes controlling the execution of payloads)
are the key elements of context information to differentiate malicious behaviors and benign
behaviors. Thus, we define a context for a security-sensitive behavior as a tuple containing
an activation events (the event that triggers the security-sensitive behavior), and a series of
context factors (environmental attributes controlling the execution of the security-sensitive
behavior).
Although our context abstraction reduces the burden in inferring context information, we
still need to address two challenges posed by mobile apps. First, inferring activation events
requires the analysis of the entry points of the app. Unlike desktop programs that have
only one entry point for a program execution (i.e., the main function), a mobile app usually
has multiple entry points due to its event-driven nature. Also, not all entry points of an
app are triggered by external events, and some of them are triggered by inter-component
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communications (ICCs) [12] within the app. It is possible that the program execution path
from the entry point triggered by an activation event to the invocation of a security-sensitive
behavior goes through a chain of components of the app. Existing analysis can identify only
the entry point of each component, and thus cannot be directly applied to infer activation
events. Second, computing context factors requires the analysis of control flows from the
activation events to the invocations of the security-sensitive behaviors. The ICCs in apps
complicate the analysis because a conditional statement controlling the execution of ICCs
may further control the security-sensitive behaviors in the target component of ICCs.
To address these challenges, we propose AppContext, an approach that statically analyzes
the security-sensitive behaviors in an Android app. To extract activation events, AppContext
chains all ICCs within the app and constructs an extended call graph (ECG) to infer
activation events. To compute context factors, AppContext combines the control flows of all
components from entry points triggered by activation events to the method calls that trigger
security-sensitive behaviors in a reduced inter-procedure control flow graph (RICFG) [13],
and leverages information flow analysis [14] to identify the environmental attributes that
affect the control flows.
To leverage the extracted contexts for differentiating malicious behaviors and benign ones,
we transform these contexts as features and use machine learning techniques, such as support
vector machine (SVM) [45], to classify security-sensitive behaviors as malware or benign
ones. We use machine learning techniques because the reasoning about the maliciousness
of a behavior is vague and subjective by nature. Simply using a static threshold (e.g., the
frequency of contexts) to differentiate malicious and benign behaviors does not perform well
because it is difficult to determine a proper threshold. For many subtle cases, machine
learning techniques are desirable to detect malware by taking multiple factors into account
and making decisions based on rich data sets statistically.
3.2 A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To illustrate our approach, we use a simplified malware example named MoonSms. Moon-
Sms is a repackaged app that carries both benign functionality and injected malicious Droid-
Dream [43] payloads. The benign functionality provides a variety of festive greetings for SMS
messages. Thus, it is rational that MoonSms requests the SEND SMS permission. Figure 3.1
shows that SmsManager.sendTextMessage (i.e., an API method that uses the SEND SMS
permission) is invoked under three contexts. Each invocation of this method is a security-
sensitive behavior of the app.
The first invocation of SmsManager.sendTextMessage occurs when the user clicks the
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ActionReceiver.OnReceive() 
Date date = new Date(); 
If(data.getHours>23 || date.getHours< 5 ){ 







long last = db.query(“LastConnectTime"); 
long current = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
If(current – last > 43200000 ){ 
   SmsManager.sendTextMessage(); 





(a) Part of the MoonSms’s call graph
(b) Code snippet of MoonSms’s manifest file
Figure 3.1: Motivating Example in MoonSMS App
“Send” button in an activity component named “SendTextActivity”. When the “Send”
button is clicked, its onClick event handler spawns a new thread that invokes SmsMan-
ager.sendTextMessage.
The second invocation of SmsManager.sendTextMessage occurs when the signal strength
of the device changes. When the signal strength changes, the system broadcasts an In-
tent containing the “SIG STR” action. MoonSms registers a broadcast receiver component
named “ActionReceiver” (Lines 8-12 in Figure 3.1(b)) to receive this Intent. When this In-
tent is broadcasted, ActionReceiver is activated and its onReceive method begins execution.
ActionReceiver’s onReceive method starts a service component named “MainService” by
invoking the startService API method (when the current time is between 11 pm and 5 am),
which begins executing MainService’s onCreate lifecycle method. Finally, MainService’s on-
Create method invokes another method named b, which calls SmsManager.sendTextMessage.
The third invocation of SmsManager.sendTextMessage occurs when MoonSms is launched.
When the MoonSms is launched, its main activity component, “SplashActivity” (Lines 1-6 in
Figure 3.1(b)), begins execution in its onCreate lifecycle method. SplashActivity’s onCreate
method invokes SmsManager.sendTextMessage when the current time is at least 12 hours
after the “LastConnectTime” is saved in a database.
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In the preceding example, the first invocation is not malicious because reviewers can
analyze the content on the screen and confirm that the security-sensitive behavior is expected
to occur. However, the second and third invocations cannot be justified by the functionality
that MoonSms is expected to provide. By inspecting the behaviors, we find that the second
and third invocations are malicious because these invocations send SMS to a confirmed
malicious server.
This example demonstrates that the contexts of security-sensitive behaviors are essential
to differentiate between benign and malicious behaviors, especially when the benign function-
ality provided by apps may rationalize the requested permissions, and the security-sensitive
method calls allowed by the requested permissions can also be used by malicious functional-
ity. AppContext focuses on exposing the contexts of security-sensitive behaviors. We refer
back to this example in the rest of the chapter to illustrate how AppContext formalizes the
abstraction of contexts of security-sensitive behaviors and extracts these contexts from app
binary code.
3.3 CONTEXT OF SECURITY-SENSITIVE BEHAVIOR
In this section, we formally define the context of a security-sensitive behavior.
We consider a security-sensitive behavior as an invocation of a security-sensitive
method under a certain context. A security-sensitive method is a method that meets at
least one of the following three requirements: (1) Permission-protected methods. Some
methods in the Android API require permissions to be invoked. Such methods usually ac-
cess security-sensitive resources and data (the detailed list of the methods is specified in
PScout [46]). (2) The methods that is either a source method or a sink method (output
channel) of an information flow. An information flow consists of a source from which the
security-sensitive data may originate and a sink to which the data may be sent (the detailed
list of sources and sinks are specified in Susi [47]). Sources and sinks are not always protected
by permission; for example, FileOutputStream.write is a sink method to write the data to a
file but does not require Android permissions to be invoked. A permission-protected method
may not be a source/sink method; for example, ContextWrapper.setWallpaper is protected
by permission SET WALLPAPER, but is neither a source nor a sink. (3) Reflection meth-
ods [48] and dynamic code-loading methods [49]. Resolving reflection or dynamic loading
methods in static analysis is a known difficult problem with fundamental limitations [50].
For this reason, we do not attempt to resolve these methods, but rather treat them as being
security sensitive. In doing so, we are being conservative, because these methods may result
in invoking other security-sensitive methods. There are a few methods in the Android API
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allowing apps to load and invoke code at runtime that has also been leveraged by existing
malware [4] (a detail list is listed on our project website [51]).
Our definition of context (Definition 4.6) includes two important characteristics that
determine the invocations of security-sensitive method calls: activation events (Definition
4.2) and context factors (Definition 4.5). Such definition represents a set of essential
elements for decision making in app inspection.
The activation events are the external events that trigger the security-sensitive methods.
The external events include UI events (events triggered by interactions on apps’ graphical
user interfaces), SYSTEM events (events initiated by the system-state changes such as
receiving SMS), and HARDWARE events (events triggered by the interactions on the device
interfaces, such as pressing the HOME or BACK button). Activation events connect security-
sensitive behaviors to the behaviors’ “initiator” in the external environment (e.g., users or
system), as the events are triggered when the external environment changes or the mobile
system reaches a certain state.
To infer activation events of security-sensitive method calls, we analyze the entry points
(e.g., ActionReceiver.OnReceive() and SendTextActivity$4.onClick() in Figure 3.1(a) ) of call
graph that contains the security-sensitive method calls. In an Android app, not all entry
points are triggered by activation events, and some of entry points can be triggered only
by inter-component communications. For example, MainService.OnCreate() is triggered by
startService() in the component ActionReceiver. An analysis needs to trace back a chain
of entry-point methods executed before the invocation of the security-sensitive methods to
identify the entry points that can be used to infer activation events.
To assist the analysis to locate entry points triggered by activation events, we first define
an extended call graph that connects all the ICCs in an app.
Definition 4.1. An extended call graph ECG = (N,E) for an app p is a directed graph
in which each node n ∈ N denotes a method in p, and each edge e(a, b) ∈ E denotes either
a calling relationship from a to b or a in one component A calls b in another component B.
An entry point of the ECG is a node ne that has no incoming edges (i.e., for each nodes
n ∈ N , e(n, ne) /∈ E).
An extended call graph (ECG) is a call graph with edges representing ICCs. The
entry point of ECG can be triggered by activation events. For example, Figure 3.2 shows
part of MoonSms’s ECG. Compared to the corresponding call graph (CG) shown in
Figure 3.1(a), the ECG has an ICC edge from ActionReceiver.OnReceive to MainSer-
vice.OnCreate, connecting the component ActionReceiver to component MainService. ECG
enables our approach (Section 3.4) to link the security-sensitive method call (SmsMan-









Figure 3.2: ECG of CG shown in Figure 3.1(a)
event (signal strength changes) can be further inferred from the entry point. We next define
the activation event.
Definition 4.2. An activation event actne,nk of a method call nk is the event that triggers
the entry point ne in an extended call graph ECG = (N,E) and there exists a call path
P = nen1n2...nk such that e(ne, n1) ∈ E and for i = 1, 2, ..., k, 1 ≤ k, e(ni−1, ni) ∈ E.
Activation events are identified by their action types, which can be inferred from entry
points. Specifically, the action types of UI events are their corresponding operation types
(e.g., click, long click), the action types of system events are state changes that trigger
the events (e.g., signal strength changes), and the action types of hardware events are the
component lifecycle phases that the events lead to (e.g., onPause, leaving the component;
onResume, re-entering the component).
The context factors are environmental attributes that control the execution of security-
sensitive method calls. The values of context factors can affect control flows from entry points
triggered by activation events to security-sensitive method calls. To precisely describe the
control flows in an Android app, we adopt and simplify the definition of an inter-procedure
control-flow graph (ICFG) from Harrold et al. [13] and define a reduced inter-procedure
control-flow graph (RICFG).
Definition 4.3. Given an ICFG, an entry point ne, and a method call nk, a reduced
inter-procedure control-flow graph RICFGne,nk is a subgraph of ICFG that contains all the
paths from ne to nk.
For example, Figure 5.9(a) shows an RICFGne,nk where the entry point ne is ActionRe-
ceiver.OnReceive() in the ECG (shown in Figure 3.2) and the security-sensitive method call
nk is sendTextMessage.
Apps usually obtain the values of the environmental attributes by using certain Java/An-
droid API methods (e.g., currentTimeMillis(), getInstalledApplications()). We denote such
API methods as environment-property methods. We next define control dependence among
statements and use control dependence and environment-property methods to define context
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factors.
Definition 4.4. In a program, if a statement ns controls whether a statement n is
executed, n is control dependent on ns.
Definition 4.5. Given an RICFGne,nk and a set of conditional statements Sne,nk in
RICFGne,nk that nk is control dependent on, a context factor fne,nk,si is an environmental
attribute whose value is used in a conditional statement si where si ∈ Sne,nk .
The context factors are computed by analyzing the information flows (data dependence)
from environment-property methods to conditional statements that control the execution of
security-sensitive method in the RICFG. Based on these definitions, we formally define a
context :
Definition 4.6. A context Cne,nk for method call nk is a tuple consisting of the activation
event actne,nk and the set of context factors {fne,nk,si |si ∈ Sne,nk} where Sne,nk is the set of
conditional statements in RICFGne,nk .
3.4 APPROACH
We next present AppContext, our approach that extracts the values of elements in the
context definition defined in Section 3.3. First, AppContext constructs a call graph from
an app’s binary and performs static analysis to locate its security-sensitive behaviors. Next,
AppContext identifies activation events by the entry points of the computed call graph, and
converts the call graph into an ECG by using ICC information. Then, AppContext constructs
RICFGs for each security-sensitive method calls in the ECG and traverses each RICFG to
find conditional statement sets. Next, AppContext finds context factors whose values are
used in conditional statements via information flow analysis and then generates the complete
contexts using identified activation events and context factors. Finally, AppContext classifies
the security-sensitive behaviors by using the features of the extracted contexts.
3.4.1 Locating Security-Sensitive Behaviors
AppContext locates security-sensitive method behaviors by constructing call graphs and
locating security-sensitive method calls within the call graphs (we leverage Flowdroid’s call
graph building [52]; please check their paper [14] for details). Security-sensitive method calls
are divided into three groups by the information used to identify them, as illustrated below.
First, the permission-protected API methods, source or sink methods, reflection methods,
and dynamic code-loading methods are all identified by using a method signature. If a
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method matches a method signature in this group, AppContext extracts and saves the
method name, permission, and the entry points for later analysis.
Second, the methods that read or write security-sensitive Content Providers are identified
by the URIs of the content providers. To access a content provider, the URI designating the
recipient content provider is passed to a ContentResolver class (Section 2). Only the method
calls using the URIs of security-sensitive content providers are security sensitive. The list of
URIs designating security-sensitive content providers is provided in PScout [46]. If the URI
parameter of a method is in the URI list, AppContext saves the URI, permission, and the
entry points for later analysis.
Finally, the methods that send or receive security-sensitive Intents are identified by the
Intent-action strings. An app can call sendBroadcast or registerReceiver with Intent action
strings to send or receive specified Intent messages. The list of Intent-action strings requiring
permissions to send or receive is provided in PScout [46]. If the intent parameter in the
method is in the list, AppContext saves the Intent-action string, permission, and the entry
points for later analysis.
3.4.2 Identifying Activation Events
As discussed in Section 3.3, the activation events are represented by their action types.
Action types can be extracted from the app’s entry points. AppContext identifies activation
events by analyzing two types of entry points. (1) For system events handled by intent
filters and hardware events, their entry points are lifecycle methods. If the components of
the lifecycle methods have intent filters specified for system Intent messages, the entry points
are invoked by system events. Otherwise, the entry points are invoked by hardware events.
(2) For both system events captured by event-handling methods and UI events, their entry
points should be event-handling methods.
Algorithm 3.1 presents the analysis used to extract activation events for the given security-
sensitive method calls. The analysis returns a list of activation events (E) for each security-
sensitive method call. The analysis takes security-sensitive method calls and their corre-
sponding entry points as input. An entry point belongs to one of two above-mentioned
categories: lifecycle methods and event-handling methods.
For the first category of entry points, lifecycle methods, the analysis first decides whether
the activation event could be a system event captured by intent filters (Line 6). If the
component that the lifecycle method belongs to has intent filters, for each intent filter, the
attributes in the intent filters are used to represent the activation events of the contexts.
For each activation event, AppContext create a tuple and saves activation event along with
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Algorithm 3.1: IdentifyActivationEvent
Inputs : B: A set of contexts without context factors and activation events (i.e., tuples consisting of
security-sensitive method calls and their entry points in call graphs)
CG: The call graph of the whole app
A: App binary code
Outputs: E: A set of contexts without context factors (i.e., tuples consisting of security-sensitive method calls,
their activation events, and corresponding entry points)
ECG: The extended call graph of the whole app
1 begin
2 E ← ∅
3 foreach b ∈ B do
4 entrypoint← getEntrypoint(b)
5 if isLifeCycleMethods(entrypoint) then
6 if hasIntentF ilters(entrypoint, A) then
// System events (by intent filters)
7 Filters← getF ilters(entrypoint, A)
8 foreach filter ∈ Filters do
9 E.addF ilter(b, filter)
10 end
11 end
12 ICC ← findICCs(CG, entrypoint)
13 if ICC 6= ∅ then
// adding ICC edges
14 CG.add(ICC)
// Recursively invoke the algorithm















the method call and the entry point in the tuple to the E list for later analysis (Line 9).
The analysis then decides whether the lifecycle method can be invoked by ICC calls
(e.g., startService, sendBroadcast) (Line 13). If there are method calls invoking the lifecycle
method, the analysis adds ICC edges to the CG (Line 14), and replaces entry points of the
ICC calls with the original entry points (Line 15). Then Algorithm 3.1 is invoked recursively
with the augmented CG (i.e., ECG) and new entry points to cover all activation events.
The activation events are then saved in the tuples for later analysis (Line 16).
If the lifecycle method cannot be invoked from app code, then the security-sensitive
method call is triggered by hardware events. We use the attributes of the lifecycle methods
to represent the activation events, and save the activation events in the tuples for later
analysis (Line 19).





If(data.getHours>23 || date.getHours< 5 ) 
StartService(MainService) 











Figure 3.3: An RICFG (a) and its corresponding ECG subgraph (b)
If(data.getHours>23  
|| date.getHours< 5 ) 
If(current – last > 43200000 ) 
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SmsManager.sendTextMessage() 
Figure 3.4: Context factors of MoonSms in Figure 3.1
attributes of the UI event-handling methods or system event-handling methods to represent
the activation events, and save the activation events in the tuples for later analysis (Line
23).
3.4.3 Extracting Context Factors
After computing the ECG and activation events for a security-sensitive method call,
AppContext constructs and traverses the RICFGs to extract context factors. As shown in
Section 3.3, the RICFGs need to be constructed based on the ECG. Thus, for each security-
sensitive method call, AppContext identifies the ECG’s entry points that can lead to the
invocation of the method. Then AppContext obtains the ICFG of the app by connecting the
CFG of each node on the ECG. Based on the ICFG, AppContext constructs the RICFGs
from each entry point to the security-sensitive method call. For each RICFG, AppContext
traverses the RICFG to identify the conditional statements on which the security-sensitive
method is control-dependent. Finally, AppContext saves the set of extracted conditional
statements with the security-sensitive method call and the corresponding activation events.
Figure 3.4 presents the analysis used to extract context factors. For each conditional
statement extracted in the previous step, AppContext tracks the information flow from the
environment-property methods (Section 3.3) to the conditional statement. The sources of
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Table 3.1: Feature categories for classification
Features of Behavior Information
Permission Security-sensitive method call
Features of Activation Event
Hardware event System event UI event
Features of Context Factors
List of environmental attributes
the information flows indicate which context factors control the invocation of the security-
sensitive behaviors. In the MoonSms example, the context factors are Calendar information,
system time, and database information. By combining the context factors with correspond-
ing activation events of the security-sensitive method calls, AppContext generates the com-
plete context tuples.
3.4.4 Classifying Security-Sensitive Behaviors
Leveraging the extracted contexts to classify security-sensitive behaviors as malicious
and benign, we formulate the detection of malicious behaviors as a classification problem.
AppContext leverages a supervised learning approach to train a classifier to compute the
conditional likelihood of a security-sensitive behavior being malicious versus benign given
context features. Specifically, AppContext uses a support vector machine (SVM) as the
classifier because SVM is very resilient to over-fitting even with a large number of values.
Classification is performed using a set of features. A feature is a function that associates
a training example with a value, i.e., a function evaluates a certain single domain-specific
criterion for the example. AppContext leverages the list of features in Table 3.1 for classifying
security-sensitive behaviors. The list consists of the features about the security-sensitive
behavior itself, and the features describing the contexts of the behavior: the activation
events and the context factors. With this list of features, AppContext generates a feature
vector for each context of a security-sensitive behavior.
Table 3.2 shows an example of feature vectors. For features describing behavior infor-
mation (i.e., Permission, Method Call), the feature values are the name of the permission
or method. For methods such as source/sink, reflection, or dynamic loading methods that
do not have corresponding permissions (i.e., do not require permissions to be invoked),
the permission names are predefined strings such as “SOURCE”, “SINK”, “REFLEC-
TION”, “DYNLOADING”. For features describing activation events, the feature values
are the action types (Section 3.3) of the events. For features describing the context factors
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Table 3.2: Feature vectors for MoonSms example
Permission Method Call Hardware System UI F3* F4* F5* ... F142
SEND SMS sendTextMessage N/A SIG STR N/A 1 0 0 ... 0
SEND SMS sendTextMessage EnterApp N/A N/A 0 1 1 ... 0
SEND SMS sendTextMessage N/A N/A Click 0 0 0 ... 0
* F3 = Calendar, F4 = System Time, F5 = Database
(F1, F2, ..., F142), the feature values are either “1” (the context contains the context factor)
or “0” (the context factor is not part of the context).
3.5 RESULTS
To evaluate the effectiveness of AppContext and using context information to detect
malware, we have conducted three evaluations.
We seek to answer the following research questions:
• RQ1: How effective is AppContext in identifying malware? How does AppContext com-
pare to the approach without context information in terms of the effectiveness of malware
identification?
• RQ2: How do activation events and context factors in our context definition contribute
to the effectiveness of malware identification?
• RQ3: How accurate is our static analysis in inferring contexts?
3.5.1 Study Subjects
Our subject apps include 846 Android apps in total (633 benign apps, 202 malicious apps,
and 11 open-source apps). To collect malicious apps, we randomly select 130 malicious apps
from a malware dataset collected by Zhou et al. [4], 30 malicious apps from the VirusShare
dataset [53], and 50 malicious apps from the Contagio dataset [54]. We also select 17
malicious apps identified by VirusTotal [55] that were posted on Google Play in 2013 but
were later removed by Google. Our final malware dataset contains 202 malicious apps. These
malicious apps cover the majority of existing Android malware families from 2011 to 2014,
which are rapidly evolving to circumvent detection by various mobile security software.
To collect benign apps, we download the top 500 apps for each category from Google Play
as of January 2013. Because FlowDroid runs out of memory on large apps, to ensure that
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enough apps can be analyzed without errors, for each category, we randomly select 20 apps
under 5 MB and 20 apps without size restriction from these top 500 apps. We also exclude
the apps identified as malware by VirusTotal and the apps that cause FlowDroid to throw
exceptions or timeout. The final benign dataset contains 633 apps. To collect open-source
apps, we randomly select 15 apps from F-Droid [56]. Among these 15 apps, we exclude 4
apps that do not have security-sensitive behaviors. Our open-source dataset contains 11
apps.
We apply AppContext to extract contexts from the subject apps. AppContext runs on a
desktop with 3.4 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB of memory. We set the timeout of
AppContext as 80 minutes, and AppContext exceeds the timeout limit for 162 apps, which
are then excluded from the later study. For the 846 apps being used as subjects, AppContext
takes on average 647 seconds to finish the analysis of one app.
3.5.2 RQ 1: Overall Effectiveness
To answer RQ1, we label the extracted contexts from the subject apps, and perform a
ten-fold cross-validation to evaluate the overall effectiveness of AppContext. To make a fair
comparison with the existing approaches that do not use context information, we apply the
supervised learning approach using all the features of AppContext, and then apply the same
supervised learning approach using the features containing only the behavior information
shown in Table 3.1 (i.e., security-sensitive method calls and permissions). The results are
shown in Table 3.3 and Table 4.4, respectively (the second and third rows).
Labelling security-sensitive method calls. Because there is no ground truth for
determining a security-sensitive method call as malicious or benign, as a best-effort solution,
we systematically label security-sensitive method calls as malicious based on the existing
malware signatures [25, 57, 55]. Specifically, we label a security-sensitive method call as
malicious if the class/package name of the method call matches any class/package name that
we collected from the existing malware signatures. We label the rest of security-sensitive
method calls as benign.
We collect class/package names from malware signatures of three sources. (1) Ap-
poscopy [25] includes a list of semantic signatures for existing malware along with a tool
to check apps’ binaries against the signatures. We run all of the subject apps using a tool
that we reproduced based on Apposcopy and record the names of the packages and classes
that match the signatures. (2) We use class names in Androguard’s signature database [57].
(3) The VirusTotal [55] service inspects malware by using a number of antivirus software
and reports the family that the malware belongs to. We identify the malware family that
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each of our malicious apps belongs to using VirusTotal, and we identify the package/class
names of the malicious payloads from the online technical reports provided by the antivirus
software vendors for each malware family.
Cross Validation. We use the labeled behaviors (i.e., method calls) both as training
and test data in a ten-fold cross-validation [58], which is a standard approach for evaluating
machine-learning techniques. It works by randomly dividing all data into 10 equally sized
buckets, training the classifier on 9 of the buckets, and classifying the remaining bucket for
testing. This process is repeated 10 times, with each of the 10 buckets used exactly once as
the testing data. We report the average precision and recall in Table 4.4.
Results. We evaluate the effectiveness of AppContext in identifying both malicious be-
haviors and malicious apps. An app is identified as a malicious app if any of its security-
sensitive method calls is identified as malicious. Table 3.3 and Table 4.4 show that App-
Context (the row of Complete Context) has higher precision and recall in both identifying
malicious behaviors and identifying malware than the existing approach that does not use
context information (the row of Behavior Information). We next present two major reasons
that cause such misidentification.
First, AppContext misidentifies a number of security-sensitive method calls triggered by UI
events and without context factors. This result suggests that compared to system events and
hardware events, UI events have less indication of the maliciousness of a security-sensitive
method call.
Second, a few method calls are incorrectly identified as malicious because we mistakenly
label similar benign behaviors as malicious. In malicious payloads, a small number of
security-sensitive method calls may not have malicious intentions, such as MediaPlayer.pause
protected by the WAKE LOCK permission in malicious payloads. However, as we label all
security-sensitive method calls in a malicious payload, AppContext incorrectly identifies such
benign method calls as malicious. This result suggests that the identification results can be
improved if the training set for the classifier is labeled more accurately.
We also evaluate the effectiveness of AppContext in identifying malicious reflective calls
or dynamic code-loading method calls. AppContext shows high precisions and recalls in
identifying malicious method calls. AppContext correctly identifies 872 out of 922 malicious
method calls but also misidentifies 180 benign method calls as malicious (i.e., 82.9% precision,
94.5% recall). AppContext correctly identifies 710 out of 787 malicious dynamic code-loading
method calls but misidentifies 137 benign method calls as malicious (i.e., 83.8% precision,
90.2% recall). For all 56 malicious apps using root exploits (which are commonly launched
by dynamic code loading [4]), only one malicious app (i.e., AsRoot) was not identified
by AppContext. As the detailed behaviors of reflective calls and dynamically-loaded code
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Table 3.3: Malicious security-sensitive behaviors identified by AppContext
Features Used P(%) R(%)
Complete Context (C) 94.8 84.8
Behavior Information (B) 79.0 37.3
Activation Events (E) 83.2 49.5
Context Factors (F) 90.6 71.2
B & E 88.0 71.3
B & F 90.2 76.9
E & F 92.5 77.3
Table 3.4: Identification of malware by AppContext
Features Used TP FP FN P(%) R(%)
Complete Context (C) 192 27 10 87.7 95.0
Behavior Information (B) 169 78 33 68.4 83.6
Activation Events (E) 163 78 39 67.6 80.6
Context Factors (F) 150 26 52 85.2 74.2
B & E 193 63 9 75.3 95.5
B & F 180 46 22 79.6 89.1
E & F 187 27 15 87.3 92.5
TP = True Positive, FP = False Positive, FN = False Negative
P = Precision, R = Recall
were unobtainable in static analysis, such results show the advantage that AppContext
can differentiate benign and malicious security-sensitive method calls without knowing the
detailed behaviors being triggered.
3.5.3 RQ2: Effectiveness of Activation Events and Context Factors
RQ2 evaluates the effectiveness of both activation events and context factors in identifying
malicious app behaviors. To answer RQ2, we use only partial features listed in Table 3.1
to train the classification model. We apply the same supervised learning approach used in
RQ1 with the features being the activation events (the row of Activation Events), context
factors (the row of Context Factors), behavior information and activation events (the row of
B & E), behavior information and context factors (the row of B & F), and activation events
and context factors (the row of E & F), respectively. The results are shown in Table 3.3 and
Table 4.4.
Results. We evaluate the effectiveness of activation events by comparing the result of the
analysis using activation events (the rows of Complete Context, B & E, and E & F) to the
result of the analysis not using activation events (the rows of B & F, B, and F) in Table 3.3
and Table 4.4. The comparison shows that adding the features of activation events to the
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analysis improves both the precision and recall of the identification results. We find that
the improvements are mainly because activation events help effectively identify malicious
method calls that have no context factors. The activation events in some of these malicious
method calls are often used by benign apps to update the UI to inform users that certain
events have occurred. For example, UMS DISCONNECTED is used to inform users that
the device has been disconnected from USB mass storage, SIG STR is used to inform users
that the phone signal strength changes, and ACTION POWER CONNECTED is used to
inform users that external power has been connected to the device. Because these events are
seldom used in benign apps to trigger security-sensitive method calls, the activation events
can effectively differentiate benign and malicious behaviors with no context factors.
We also evaluate the effectiveness of context factors by comparing the results of the
analysis using context factors (the row of Complete Context, B & F, and E & F) with
the result of analysis not using context factors (the row of B & E, B, and E). The result
shows that the analysis using context factors has relatively higher precisions (over 90% for
identifying malicious behaviors and around 80% for identifying malware). We find that
the improvement in the precision is mainly because context factors effectively help identify
the malicious behaviors whose activation events are UI events. We also find that context
factors can disambiguate the malicious and benign intentions for certain vague cases when
security-sensitive method calls are protected by commonly-used resources (e.g., Internet).
For example, we find that some of benign apps and malware will both connect to servers
(URL.openConnection) after the apps start, and thus the activation events and behaviors for
both apps are the same. However, the context factors of malware include data from an Intent
message (Intent.getExtras) and data from the Internet (URL.openStream), suggesting that
whether the apps connect to the server or not is determined by whoever sends the Intent
message or the Internet data. Such context factors demonstrate the command & control
nature of certain families of malware.
In addition, context factors also reflect controls of security-sensitive method calls in benign
apps. For example, we find that a few benign apps and malware obtain device information
(TelephonyManager.getDeviceId etc.) after the apps start. The difference between two types
of apps is that the benign apps invoke getDeviceId only when auto logins are successful (i.e.,
the context factors for getDeviceId include information from the database or the Internet).
But malware directly sends device information to the server (i.e, no context factors).
Finally, we further evaluate the effectiveness of contexts by running analysis using features
of activation events and context factors (the row of E & F). The precision and recall of the
analysis are comparable as the precision and recall of the analysis using complete context.
Such results suggest that contexts can identify a number of malicious method calls without
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knowing the detailed behaviors being triggered, consistent with the analysis result for be-
haviors that invoke reflection or dynamic code-loading methods. Both results indicate that
the maliciousness of a security-sensitive method call is more closely related to the behavior’s
intention (reflected via contexts) than the type of the security-sensitive resources that the
behavior accesses.
3.5.4 RQ3: Accuracy of Static Analysis
To evaluate the effectiveness of the extracted contexts, we dynamically verify whether
the security-sensitive method is invoked by triggering the activation events and configuring
context factors based on the contexts. The execution path triggered by the activation events
may vary when the context factors are assigned different values. In this evaluation, we use
only open-source apps as the subjects. The main reason is that these apps come with source
code, which can be used to easily infer the correct values of context factors in controlling the
execution of the security-sensitive method calls. AppContext is applied on 11 open-source
apps to extract contexts and the analysis time is logged.
To verify the correctness of context factors, we analyze the source code to check whether
a security-sensitive method call is control dependent on each context factor. If the control
dependence exists, we determine the values of the context factors that lead to the execution
of the security-sensitive method call. We then configure the external environment based on
the inferred values of context factors and trigger the activation events of 88 security-sensitive
behaviors of these apps.
We use the activity manager through the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to simulate
system events, and manually simulate hardware and UI events. We configure the values
of each context factor by changing configuration of emulators. Then, we use the profiler of
the activity manager to log the executions of the apps. To monitor the execution traces, we
start the profiler before firing the activation events and stop the profiler 5 seconds afterwards.
The preceding evaluation process has some limitations. The profiler cannot trace the
invocations of the onCreate or onDestoy methods, because the profiling must be started after
the creation of an app’s process and be stopped before the destruction of the app’s process.
We also exclude events that cannot be simulated through ADB such as error events (e.g.,
triggering the onError method in MediaPlayer.OnErrorListener) and the context factors
whose value we cannot manipulate such as data from URL connection).
Results. Table 3.5 shows our evaluation results. Among the 88 generated contexts, we are
able to confirm 82 contexts (i.e., 93.2% accuracy). Six contexts cannot be verified because the
activation events could not trigger the security-sensitive method calls. The context factors
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Table 3.5: Effectiveness of context extraction
# App # Context # Verified Context Time(sec)
11 88 82 291
of all the contexts whose activation events could trigger the security-sensitive method calls
are accurate. The average analysis time is 291 seconds, which is acceptable for the app
reviewing process. Note that the evaluation result is conservative since the inferred values
for context factors may not be accurate.
3.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we introduce AppContext, an approach of static program analysis that
extracts the contexts of security-sensitive behaviors to assist app analysis in differentiating
between malicious and benign behaviors. We implement a prototype of AppContext and
evaluate AppContext on 202 malicious apps from various malware datasets, and 633 benign
apps from the Google Play Store. AppContext correctly identifies 192 malicious apps with
87.7% precision and 95% recall. Our evaluation results suggest that the maliciousness of a
security-sensitive behavior is more closely related to the intention of the behavior (reflected
via contexts) than the type of the security-sensitive resources that the behavior accesses.
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CHAPTER 4: ADVERSARIAL-RESILIENT STATIC ANALYSIS:
ENTITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF MOBILE
APPS
4.1 OVERVIEW
Malware detection based on behaviors represents a prominent class of malware-detection
approaches where characteristics of known malware samples are used as a basis of iden-
tifying new malware [25, 4, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64]. These approaches typically work in
two phases: malicious-behavior characterization and malicious-behavior detection. The
behavior-characterization phase is used to derive a specification of the malicious behav-
iors, which may either be manually specified as malware signatures or automatically mined
as malware models in a suitable representation. In the behavior-detection phase, techniques
of static or dynamic program analysis are used to analyze a given mobile app for possible
matches against the specified signatures or mined models.
Limitations of existing approaches. Existing malware detection approaches [25, 65,
14, 22, 66, 67, 28, 68, 15, 30, 25] (based on specified signatures or mined models) suffer from
the overfitting problem (i.e., tailored to be capable of detecting only the malware samples
used for deriving the signatures or models) for two main reasons: limited expressiveness and
limited accuracy.
Limited expressiveness. The existing approaches primarily use information-leaking
dataflows within the app as the basis of a malicious behavior. This characterization is
ill-equipped to capture the roles of each party (e.g., initiator) for the malicious behavior
and the provenance of the malicious behavior (e.g., who controls the flows). So the existing
approaches typically fail to capture malicious behaviors initiated and controlled by malicious
servers, such as initiating spams or launching denial-of-service attacks. Without a proper
characterization for these behaviors, the existing approaches turn to easily mutable features
(shared across malware samples of the same family) such as network addresses or other
string constants to detect these behaviors, allowing malware developers to easily change
these features to evade detection.
Limited accuracy. Using implementation-specific structures (e.g., API methods, objects),
the existing approaches fail to accurately express common malicious behaviors consisting of
interactions between the malware and entities in its environments. For example, a malware
signature can be specified to express a GingerMaster malware sample’s malicious behavior
segmented into four phases: (1) the app retrieves and preprocesses a phone number from
the telephony manager (entity A); (2) the app writes the preprocessed phone number into a
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temporary file (entity B); (3) the app reads the preprocessed phone number from the same
temporary file (entity B); (4) the app sends the preprocessed phone number to a (malicious)
server (entity C). For Phases 2 and 3, the existing approaches can recognize that the app
interacts with some files (i.e., the type of entities) based on the app’s invoking API methods
on a Java File object, but cannot recognize that the file in Phase 2 is indeed the same as
the file in Phase 3.
Therefore, the existing approaches can produce false positives by matching the malware
signature with a benign app where the preprocessed phone number is saved to a file, and
non-sensitive information being read from a different file is sent to a server. In addition, the
GingerMaster malware family has seven variations (i.e., different implementations) during
the period from 2011 to 2013 [69]. Malware samples of these variations can either (1) skip
Phases 2 and 3 by directly sending the preprocessed phone number to the malicious server or
(2) replace the temporary file entity in Phases 2 and 3 to be a temporary database. Thus, the
existing approaches can also produce false negatives (by including in the malware signature
the specific behavior of Phases 1-4).
To address such significant limitations of the existing approaches, in this chapter, we
present a novel approach, EnMobile, consisting of techniques for malware-behavior charac-
terization and detection, respectively.
Malware-behavior characterization. Our approach is motivated by the finding [4,
69, 15] that more than 90% of current mobile malware have a command-and-control (C&C)
architecture, where the malware receive and respond to commands from an external ac-
tor, e.g., a remote server. Thus, our approach directly characterizes the underlying C&C
structure of the malware. In particular, EnMobile improves the existing malware-behavior
characterization in two main aspects.
Entity-based characterization. Without using implementation-specific structures or easily
mutable features (e.g., API methods, objects) in an app, EnMobile expresses the app’s
behaviors in terms of interactions among entities. Entities are a host of actors on the mobile
platform including mobile system components (e.g., the telephony manager, SMS manager,
contacts provider), local on-device resources (e.g., files, databases), other mobile apps and
libraries, human users, and network locations, etc. EnMobile recognizes entities through
their identities (e.g., files with different names are different entities).
Furthermore, introducing the concept of entity allows security analysts to express entity
interactions in an end-to-end fashion, making it much more independent of specific realiza-
tions of that interaction (e.g., specifics in Phases 2 and 3), and hence more robust. For
example, for the malware family of the example sample, security analysts can specify the
information flow from the telephony manager (entity A) to the malicious server (entity C)
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by just using the two end-point entities (entities A and C) without enumerating all possible
intermediate-point entities (e.g., files, databases).
Flow-provenance predicates. Going beyond using information-leaking dataflows within the
app, EnMobile enriches interactions among entities with provenance information. Prove-
nance in our context refers to who controls the flow, and why, i.e., the specific intended
purpose of the flow [28, 70, 71, 72]. For example, the existing approaches may produce an
information flow (file → sendTextMessage). Such flow can match both the behavior of
sending contents of a file out through SMS (a benign action of sending predefined messages)
and the behavior of specifying which phone numbers that the SMS should be sent to (a ma-
licious action of sending premium messages). To address such issue, we propose a set of data
flow predicates (Section 4.3.1) to reflect the purpose (e.g., passing configuration parameters
vs. purely transmitting information to another entity) that an information flow within an
app can serve for, a set of control flow predicates (Section 4.3.1) to present the ownership of
information flows (i.e., the entities that initiate/control the information flows).
Malware-behavior detection. As the entity-based characterization is more abstract
than the existing approaches using implementation-specific features, EnMobile includes vari-
ous static analyses enabling the instantiation of the characterization (i.e., extracting program
information from malware samples and matching such information against the signatures)
in the following two main aspects (besides supporting flow-provenance predicates).
Identification of entities and entity references. In order to characterize an app’s behaviors
directly in terms of its interactions with entities of the app, one challenge is to extract the
correspondence between an in-program object (named as an entity reference) and the entity
with which the object may interact in a given execution context (e.g., calling context). To
infer the entities that each Java object can point to, we develop an identity-propagation
algorithm that conducts a flow- and context-sensitive analysis extended from taint analy-
sis [14]. Such algorithm addresses two main issues. First, multiple objects could point to
the same entity. Second, a given program object can interact with different entities under
different execution contexts.
Matching against signatures. As discussed earlier, malware typically perform malicious
behaviors segmented into multiple phases (e.g., downloading, preprocessing), storing inter-
mediate computation results in temporary files or databases. Such segmentation gives rise to
multiple segments of information flow, punctuated with interactions with entities (e.g., files
or databases). These segments would need to be “stitched together” in order to be properly
matched against a signature specified to characterize the end-to-end interaction. To address
the challenge, we propose a flow-sensitive stitching algorithm to ensure that the connected
information flows are feasible in the actual execution.
33
This chapter makes the following main contributions:
• Characterization. We identify malware interaction patterns with entities and prove-
nance information of the interactions as a corner stone of comprehensively characterizing
mobile malware. We also propose a novel signature-specification language, based on this
characterization, that enables security analysts to create robust, abstract specifications.
• Detection. We design static analyses to derive the entity-based characterization by
analyzing bytecode of a given app, including identifying entities and entity references,
extracting provenance information for flows, and matching against signatures in the face
of segmented flows.
• Implementation and Evaluations. We present a practical implementation of our
approach and evaluate its effectiveness, on a set of 6614 apps consisting of malware (from
Genome [4] and Drebin [15]) and benign apps (from Google Play). Our results show
that EnMobile achieves substantially higher precision and recall than four state-of-the-art
approaches.
Related Work. Existing malware detection approaches characterize malware behaviors
by features that commonly exist in malware but not in benign apps. These approaches
include mining (MUDFLOW [65]), clustering (CHABADA [66]), classification (AppCon-
text [28]), graph matching (Astroid [68], Apposcopy [25]), and natural language processing
(AsDroid [73], WHYPER [23]) etc. However, non-essential features (e.g., component type,
file name, unrelated information flows) in code clones are often mistaken by these approaches
as discriminative features. Copy-paste practice is prevalent in malware industry, resulting
in many code clones in malware samples [74]. Because the same code snippet has appeared
in many malware samples, these approaches may regard those non-essential features in code
clones as major discriminant factors (because the same pieces of code snippet have appeared
in many malware samples but not in benign apps). EnMobile provides security analysts a
way to directly characterize malware behaviors through the high-level interactions among
entities instead of leveraging a specific implementation difference in the malware.
EnMobile also falls into the general category of information flow analysis. Much work has
been proposed to enhance static analysis of mobile apps [75, 76, 77, 22, 78, 20, 79, 80, 81, 82,
83, 19, 84, 85]. Information flow analysis tracks whether privacy-sensitive data (i.e., sources)
flows to outgoing channels or sensitive outlets (i.e., sinks). EnMobile complements existing
information flow analysis by adding entity-based characterization to the information flow.
AAPL [77] uses enhanced data flow analysis techniques to increase the number of data flows
that can be detected by information flow analysis and then uses the peer-voting mechanism
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1 TrickMe controls three behaviors via commands from a C&C server:
2 B1: Sending the user’s SMS to the C&C server through Internet
3 B2: Performs click fraud based on coordinates provided by the C&C server
4 B3: Downloading malicious payloads from downloading servers whose addresses are specified by
the C&C server, and renaming the downloaded files based on the names provided by the C&
C server.
Figure 4.1: Natural language description of Malware TrickMe
1 public void onCreate(Bundle b) {
2 ...
3 String v0 = ”http://www.malicious.com”;
4 URL url = new java.net.URL(v0); //<url, CON 1>
5 HttpURLConnection n = url.openConnection(); //<n, CON 1>
6 f s = new File(”server.xml”); //<f s, FILE 1>
7 f c = new File(”commandFile”);//<f c, FILE 2>
8 f info = new File(”infoFile”);
9 f n = new File(”coordinateFile”); //<f n, FILE 3>
10 f d = new File(”downloadFile”);
11 f f = new File(”fileNameFile”);
12 read(f s, n); // Reading message from n to f s
13 parse(f s, f c, f n, f d, f f); //Parsing f s into four files
14 readSMS(f info); ... }
Figure 4.2: onCreate method of MainActivity
to lower the false positive rate to report illegitimate information leakages. AAPL fails to
handle obfuscation techniques such as string encryption (by using constant propagation
analysis) and produces high false positives (by matching all sources with all potential sinks).
EnMobile resolves these two limitations by precisely computing the identity of an entity.
SPARTA [86] and FlowDroid [14] are two general information flow analysis frameworks.
SPARTA enables the flow-policy checking by providing an integrity type system to annotate
source code with information-flow type qualifiers. FlowDroid is a static taint analysis tool
for Android apps based on Soot [87] and Heros [88]. EnMobile complements SPARTA and
FlowDroid by analyzing all types of data flows to detect malicious behaviors that are not
information leakage (e.g., bot-driven C&C behaviors).
4.2 A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We illustrate our approach using a simple malware example TrickMe, shown in Figure 4.2,
Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.4, which is derived from several real pieces of malware. Its C&C
35
1 public void onStop() {
2 ...
3 for(String command: readLine(f c)){
4 if(command.equals(”click”)){
5 float [] axis = getAxis(readLine(f n));
6 MotionEvent down = MotionEvent.obtain(...,0, axis[0],axis[1],0);
7 MotionEvent up = MotionEvent.obtain(...,1, axis[0],axis[1],0);
8 ...
9 Activity adActivity = ...; //<s,AdsPlatform>








18 String [] filename = readLine(f f);
19 int i = 0;
20 for(String url: readLine(f d)){
21 File f i = new RandomAccessFile(filename[i++],”rw”);
22 read(f i, new java.net.URL(url).openConnection());
23 }}}...}
Figure 4.3: onStop method of MainActivity
1 public String [] readLine(File file){ //<file, FILE 2>, <file, FILE 3>
2 FileReader r = new FileReader(file); //<r, FILE 2>, <r, FILE 3>
3 BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(r);//<br, FILE 2>, <br, FILE 3>
4 String line = br.readLine(); ...
5 return line; }
Figure 4.4: readLine method of MainActivity
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structure comes from Geinimi [89], its downloading behavior mimics Answerbot [90], and its
information leakage behaviors follow BeanBot [91]. TrickMe has three malicious behaviors
driven by a remote malicious server as described in Figure 4.1. All three behaviors reside in
an Activity component MainActivity, the MAIN Activity component of TrickMe, which is
invoked when the malware is launched.
TrickMe receives commands and prepares necessary information for future malicious be-
haviors in the onCreate method of MainActivity (Figure 4.2). It first opens a network
connection to a malicious server (Lines 3 - 5), and reads a message from the server to
file server.xml (Line 12). It then parses the server.xml into the four files commandFile,
coordinateFile, downloadFile, and fileNameFile (Line 13). Finally, it reads a list of SMSs
into file infoFile (Line 14).
In the onStop method of MainActivity (Figure 4.3), TrickMe launches one of three differ-
ent malicious behaviors based on different commands received earlier from the server. On
command sendInfo it sends the content of infoFile to the server, on command click it com-
putes and clicks on the X-Y coordinates computed based on the numbers in coordinateFile
to incur click fraud [92], and on command install it downloads malicious payloads from
URL addresses listed in downloadFile, and names the downloaded files according to the list
of names in fileNameFile. The downloaded payloads are used by TrickMe to launch other
malicious behaviors.
Comparison of signatures in Apposcopy and EnMobile. In a signature-based
scheme for malware detection, such as Apposcopy [25], security analysts can specify the
control-flow and data-flow properties shown in Figure 4.5 as the signature for the TrickMe
malware.
The activity(a) predicate declares an activity component a. The icc(SYSTEM, a, MAIN,
) predicate states an inter-component communication from the system to the activity a
and the content of the communication is a “MAIN” intent message. The flow(a, SMS, a,
file) predicate represents an information flow from source SMS in component a to sink file
in component a (Figure 4.2, Line 14).
Although the specified predicates do represent valid information flows and triggering events
in TrickMe, they are insufficient for representing the unique characteristics of the malware,
and therefore may be unable to differentiate malware from a benign app. For example, a
benign SMS manager app can sync the app’s configuration with a server (BufferedReader
 URLConnection), (URLConnection  file), and back up SMSs (SMS  file) where  
indicates an information flow. Such an app also possesses the same control-flow and data-
flow properties as TrickMe, as per Apposcopy’s characterization, and would therefore be
indistinguishable from TrickMe.
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1 activity(a), icc(SYSTEM, a, MAIN, ),
2 flow(a, URLConnection, a, file),
3 flow(a, BufferedReader, a, URLConnection),
4 flow(a, BufferedReader, a, file),
5 flow(a, SMS, a, file)
Figure 4.5: Characterization of TrickMe in Apposcopy [25]
Figure 4.6 presents the signature of TrickMe specified by security analysts in EnMobile.
EnMobile allows to accurately characterize TrickMe in three perspectives. First, EnMobile
allows to designate the entities that certain behaviors may be attributed to, and thereby
precisely characterize the purpose of the behaviors. For example, a unique behavior of
TrickMe is its use of the “command” read from “commandFile” sent from the C&C server,
to direct the launching of different malicious behaviors. Identifying and implicating the
entity of the remote C&C server, rather than the local file “commandFile” (as the existing
approaches would do), are key to recognizing the true nature of this behavior.
Second, EnMobile allows to stitch segments of the end-to-end flow behavior exhibited
by TrickMe. For example, the signature in Apposcopy includes only the benign-looking
flows (SMS file) and (BufferedReader URLConnection), while EnMobile infers these
flows as segments of a larger, and potentially malicious flow (i.e.,Transmit*(s, n 2) of
UploadMessage in Figure 4.6 indicating the behavior of sending SMSs to a web server ).
Third, EnMobile detects malicious behaviors other than information leakage. EnMobile
captures several non-leakage behaviors in TrickMe (click fraud, downloading and renaming
file). Such detection needs a more nuanced characterization of information flows. As our
results show (Sec. 4.5.3), characterization can significantly impact the accuracy of malware
detection.
4.3 ENTITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATION
Broadly, EnMobile aims to characterize an app in terms of its relevant interactions with
entities. To this end, it tracks and precisely characterizes information flows associated with
the security-sensitive behaviors of an app. We next illustrate some preliminaries before
presenting characterization in EnMobile.
Security-sensitive Behavior. A security-sensitive behavior is an invocation of
a security-sensitive method. We consider two types of methods as security sensitive:
permission-protected methods and other source/sink methods that read/write information.
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Permission-protected methods are API methods that require permissions to access security-
sensitive resources and data. We use the list of permission-protected methods specified in
PScout [46], and the list of source/sink methods specified in Susi [47]. Further, we follow
PScout [46] to label each security-sensitive method call with one of a small set of abstract
actions (e.g.,SEND, RECEIVE, READ, WRITE), based on its overall behavior. These action
labels are used in our characterization (Section 4.3.1).
Entity. An entity is an external resource that an app interacts with during its execution.
Entities may include network locations (e.g., URLs or phone numbers) external to the device
running the app, such as the URL of a C&C server. They may also include on-device
intermediate storage sites (e.g., files, databases) or specific Android system resources (e.g.,
the SMS Manager), with which the app may interact during execution. Entities form the
sources (providing information) or targets/sinks (consuming information) of information
flows to/from the app. An entity is defined by a tuple: < entity type, entity identifier >.
Entity type. The type identifies the category of entity, such as a file or a network location
(File, UrlConnect), as well as the type of communication channel of the app with the entity,
such as an SMS communication with a phone number (SmsTarget) and a phone call to a
number (PhoneTarget).
Entity identifier. The identifier is the name or address of the entity, such as a filename,
a URL, or a phone number, which together with the entity type can be used to uniquely
identify the entity. In EnMobile, entity identifier values are stored and propagated in the
program via (primitive-type or string-type) constants or symbolic expressions (involving
variables provided by the external input, e.g., network message, user input).
Entity reference. An entity reference is an in-program object or variable that serves
as a proxy of the entity within the app and through which the app communicates with the
entity. For example, variable f s, in Figure 4.2, Line 6, is a reference of a File entity with
identifier “server.xml”. An entity may have multiple references. Conversely, a single object,
such as the Android SMS Manager, may instantiate different entities (e.g., SMSs to different
phone numbers) at different points during the app’s execution.
4.3.1 Language Specification
We propose a language to characterize an app based on its interactions with entities. One
use of such characterization is to write signatures for recognizing malware. Figure 4.6 shows
a signature characterizing the TrickMe example.
The characterization is a set of Datalog rules. Each rule, of the form: head :- predicate1,
predicate2, ... , is a horn clause, defining a predicate head as the conjunction (logical
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1 TrickMe(a) :− Download(a), SendMessage(a), UploadMessage(a)
2
3 ClickAds(a):− Connection(n), AdsPlatform(s), SysUIEvent(e),
4 Config∗(n, s, TOUCH), Control∗(n, s, TOUCH), Trigger(e, s, TOUCH).
5
6 Download(a) :− Connection(n), SysUIEvent(e), Connection(n i),
7 Initiate∗(n, n i), File(f i), Initiate∗(n, f i), Transmit(n i, f i),
8 Trigger(e, f i, WRITE), Control∗(n, f i, WRITE).
9
10 UploadMessage(a) :− Connection(n), SysUIEvent(e), Connection(n 2),
11 SmsInbox(s), Transmit∗(s, n 2), Control∗(n, n 2, WRITE),
12 Trigger(e, n 2, WRITE).
Figure 4.6: Characterization of TrickMe in EnMobile
Table 4.1: App-behavior description language
Type Syntax Definition
Event SysEvent(v), UiEvent(v), v: event of appropriate type
Predicate SysUiEvent(v) (one of three event types: System event, UI event, or System UI event)
Entity Entity(e), File(e), UrlConnect(e), e: entity of appropriate type
Predicate SmsTarget(e), SmsInbox(e) (partial list of potential entity types)
Transmit(esource, etarget) esource: source entity, etarget: target entity
Transmit*(esource, etarget) Transmit*(es, et) :- Entity(ei), Transmit*(es, ei), Transmit(ei, et)
Data-flow Config(esource, etarget, a) esource: source entity, etarget: target entity, a: target entity’s action
Predicate Config*(esource, etarget, a) Config*(es, et, a) :- Entity(ei), Transmit*(es, ei), Config(ei, et, a)
Initiate(esource, etarget) esource: source entity, etarget: target entity
Initiate*(esource, etarget) Initiate*(es, et) :- Entity(ei), Transmit*(es, ei), Initiate(ei, et)
Control-flow Trigger(vtrigger, etarget, a) vtrigger : triggering event, etarget: implicated entity, a: security sensitive action
Predicate Control(econtrol , etarget, a) econtrol: controlling entity, etarget: controlled entity, a: security sensitive action
Control*(econtrol, etarget, a) Control*(ec, et, a) :- Entity(ei), Transmit*(ec, ei), Control(ei, et, a)
AND) of one or more other predicates (e.g.,predicate1). A predicate is a relation name
with variables or constants as arguments.
Table 4.1 provides an informal specification of our proposed language. It consists of four
kinds of predicates, namely event, entity, data-flow, and control-flow predicates, described
next.
Event predicate. Event predicates declare relevant events, as one of three types: System,
UI, or System UI events. A system event is one initiated by the system-state changes, e.g.,
receiving an SMS, a UI event is triggered by interactions on an app’s graphical user interface,
and a system UI event is triggered by the interactions on the device interfaces, such as
pressing an app’s icon on the system’s screen to launch the app. This categorization follows
previous work on Android testing [28].
Entity predicate. Entity predicates declare specific entities, each of a specific type, with
which the app interacts during its execution. For example, in Figure 4.6, File(f) denotes a
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file entity f. Table 4.1 lists a few examples of currently recognized types.
Data-flow predicates
We make the observation that the intent of an information flow can be determined based on
a specific parameter of the sink method that it flows into. The reason is that each parameter
of a (sink) method plays a specific role in executing its behavior. Thus, our characterization
categorizes each parameter of a sink method into one of three types: (1) transmit parameters,
which receive data to be written to a target entity, (2) config parameters, which are used to
configure security-sensitive behaviors, and (3) initiate parameters, which carry identifiers,
e.g., the file name, to initialize a target entity. Based on this characterization, information
flows can also be categorized as Transmit, Config, or Initiate, and represented using the
corresponding predicates as explained below. To implement this characterization, we pre-
compile lists of transmit, config, initiate parameters and their corresponding methods for
common entities in the Android SDK, as a one-time effort for Android.
Predicate Transmit (Transmit* ). The Transmit predicate encodes data transmission
from a source entity esource to a target entity etarget, where the app reads information
from esource and writes it to etarget. An information flow satisfies a Transmit predicate
if it flows into a designated transmit parameter of a sink method. For example, in the
TrickMe characterization (Figure 4.6), predicate Transmit(n i, f i) encodes the behavior
of downloading payloads from given URLs (n i) to files (f i).
We also define the predicate Transmit*(esource, etarget), to represent information transi-
tively flowing from esource to etarget through a sequence of Transmit flows. For example, the
Transmit*(s, n 2) (Figure 4.6) encodes the behavior of reading an SMS from SMSInbox s,
storing it into file “f info” (Line 14, Figure 4.2) and subsequently forwarding it to a given
URL n 2 (Line 15, Figure 4.3).
Predicate Config (Config* ). This predicate encodes information flows from a source
entity esource to target entity etarget initiated exclusively for configuring the behavior of
a security-sensitive action a performed by etarget. Similar to Transmit, the definition is
extended to define predicates Config*, as per Table 4.1. For example, in the TrickMe
malware, the number saved in the “coordinateFile” is used to configure the behavior of
dispatchTouchEvent (Lines 4-7 in Figure 4.3), as the content in the “coordinateFile” is
from network connection n, the configuration relationship is represented by Config*(n, s,
TOUCH).
Predicate Initiate (Initiate* ). This predicate represents behavior where the entity
identifier (e.g., a file name) of a target entity etarget is read from a source entity esource and
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Table 4.2: Identity propagation logic
Statement Type Format Flow Functions Propagation Description
Entity Initialization x = new(ainit, a0, ..., an), n ∈ N i© Iout
s
= Iin ∪ x, ainit ∈ Iin Indicative parameter → Left-hand side (LHS)
Assign x = y ii© Iout
s
= Iin ∪ x , y ∈ Iin Right-hand side (RHS) → LHS
Identity Setter x.set(y) iii© Iout
s
= Iin ∪ x , y ∈ Iin Tainted parameter → Caller object (e.g., y→x)
Call c.m(a0, ..., an), n ∈ N iv© Iout
s
= Iin ∪ {a′i}, ∀ai ∈ Iin Caller parameter → Callee (Context switching)
Return return y; x = c.m(a0, ..., an), n ∈ N v© Iout
s
= Iin ∪ x , y ∈ Iin Returned object → LHS
flows into an initialization statement used to instantiate etarget. Initiate can be extended to
predicate Initiate*, as defined in Table 4.1. In the TrickMe signature (Figure 4.6), predicate
Initiate*(n, f i) represents behavior that file f i is instantiated using its identifier read
from file “filenameFile” (Lines 13-16, Figure 4.3), which itself is downloaded from network
connection n (Lines 11-14, Figure 4.2).
Control-flow predicates
These predicates capture the “who” of security-sensitive behaviors, i.e., which entity or
event controls them, a key determinant of the maliciousness of behaviors.
Predicate Trigger. The Trigger predicate asserts that a given security-sensitive behav-
ior is triggered by a certain event. Specifically, predicate Trigger(Vtrigger, etarget, A) is true
if event Vtrigger triggers the execution path to a method call performing an action A (e.g.,
upload information), where etarget (e.g., URL connection) is the target entity whose reference
in the program makes the security-sensitive method call. For example, the onStop method
of TrickMe (Figure 4.3), which can be triggered by a System UI event such as pressing the
HOME button, contains three specific behaviors. The three Trigger(e,*,*) predicates in
Figure 4.6 capture this triggering relationship.
Predicate Control. The Control predicate asserts that a security-sensitive action a,
performed by a reference of entity etarget, is control-dependent on another entity econtrol.
Specifically, predicate Control(econtrol , etarget, a) is true if and only if there exists an
information flow from a reference of econtrol to a conditional statement guarding the execution
of a security-sensitive method call, performing action a. Control can also be extended to
predicate Control*, as defined in Table 4.1. In the TrickMe example, the command sent from
URLConnection n controls the three malicious behaviors. The predicates Control*(n, *,
















Figure 4.7: Overview of EnMobile
4.4 ENTITY-BASED STATIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we present how EnMobile matches an Android program against the given
malware signatures specified with the entity-based characterization. Figure 5.5 presents
the overview of EnMobile. EnMobile takes the bytecode of an app as input and outputs
an entity-based characterization of the app’s data and control flows, expressed in terms of
the predicates defined in Section 4.3.1. At the meta level, such process takes four steps:
(1) identify entities (i.e., entity type and entity identifier); (2) map entities to program
objects (i.e., entity references); (3) extract entity-based flow facts through analysis on entity
references and augment the extracted flow facts with provenance information; (4) match the
flow facts against the malware signatures.
4.4.1 Identifying Entities and Entity References
For the purpose of analysis, EnMobile categorizes entity references into two types: initial
entity reference and alias entity reference. Normally identifying an entity reference depends
on a parameter (e.g., file name) in the statement that initializes the reference. We call such
a parameter as an indicative parameter. If an indicative parameter is constant or external
input (e.g., user input, network message), we term the entity reference initialized by the
parameter as initial entity reference. If an indicative parameter is a variable that in turn
points to the initial entity reference (e.g., variable file and r in Lines 2-3, Figure 4.4), we
term the entity reference initialized by the parameter as alias entity reference.
For brevity, we use only entities related to the SMS-sending behavior in TrickMe as
examples to illustrate the techniques in the rest of the section. For each entity reference
involved in sending SMS, we use red comments in Figure 3.1 to show the pair of the entity
reference (i.e., variable) and the entity that the reference points to. For example, in TrickMe,
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url, f s, f c, f info, f n, f d, f f in Figure 4.2 are initial entity references, while n in
Figure 4.2 and r, br in Figure 4.4 are alias entity references.
Identifying entities. EnMobile identifies entities via initial entity references. In partic-
ular, EnMobile identifies the entity type through the Java types of initial entity references.
For example, in Figure 4.2, f s has java Type File indicating the entity type as file.
EnMobile extracts the entity identifier through the indicative parameter of the initial entity
reference. An indicative parameter can either be constant or external input. For a constant
identifier, EnMobile records the constant value as the identity of the entity. For an external-
input identifier, EnMobile computes a symbolic expression as the identity of the entity. The
symbolic expression is computed by a combination of sources of the variable (constant or
user input) and the propagation paths from the sources to the variable. The reason why we
choose to compute the symbolic expression instead of using constant propagation analysis
to infer the actual value of the identifier is to deal with the situations where the identifier
value goes through an encryption scheme.
Mapping entities to entity references. Initial entity references are naturally mapped
to entities after identifying the entities. Mapping alias entity references to corresponding
entities is still challenging for two main reasons. First, multiple references could point to
the same entity. In Figure 4.4, r and br point to the file entity referred to by file. The
identity of the entity can be propagated from one reference to another as one reference is
used to initialize another object. Second, an entity reference may point to different entities
under different execution contexts. In Figure 4.4, r and br can point to “commandFile”,
“coordinateFile”, or “downloadFile” in different executions.
We develop an identity propagation algorithm to compute the entities that each alias entity
reference points to. For a given initial entity reference, the identity propagation computes a
set of entity references that point to the same entity as the initial entity reference; we refer
to this set as reference set. The idea of identity propagation extends the idea of the taint
propagation. The identity taints are generated at each initial entity reference. Any entity
reference being tainted points to the same entity as the initial entity reference of the taint.
Table 4.2 informally presents the flow functions used in the identity propagation algorithm.
A flow function of a statement maps the set of dataflow facts in that hold before the
statement to the set of dataflow facts out that hold after the statement. Here a dataflow
fact is the reference set of identities. In identity propagation, the flow function maps Iin
(i.e., reference set before the statement) to Iout (i.e., reference set after the statement). In
our implementation, I is a set of pairs <var, entity-ID>. We categorize program statements
that can propagate identity taints into five types: entity initialization statement, assignment
statement, identity setter method (i.e., method that sets the identity of an entity), normal
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method (i.e., method except entity initialization and identity setter methods), call statement,
and return statement. Each type of statements is represented as a type of edges in “exploded
supergraph” [93] of IFDS framework. We conservatively assume that reference sets remain
the same for other edges (e.g., edges do not belong to any of these five statement types)
in the exploded supergraph [93]. Note that we omit formal details (e.g., object sensitivity,
context sensitivity) in the table. After the reference set has been calculated for each identity,
EnMobile iterates through all identities and merges the reference sets if two identities are
identical (i.e., two identities with the same identifier value and same type).
In the TrickMe example, n in Figure 4.2 and r, br in Figure 4.4 are alias entity references.
The identity taint CON 1 is generated from url and propagated to n by applying i© 1. For
r and br, the identity File 2 first propagates from Line 3 in Figure 4.3 to variable file on
Line 1 in Figure 4.4 by applying iv©. Then the identity further propagates to r and br by
applying i©. Note that identity File 3 also propagates (Line 5 in Figure 4.3) to file, r, and
br. However, because our analysis is context-sensitive, the later information-flow analysis is
able to tell that the variable command on Line 3 in Figure 4.3 is tainted by the information
from File 2, and variable axis[] on Line 5 in Figure 4.3 is tainted by the information from
File 3.
We perform two customizations in our information flow analysis. First, the sources of our
identity propagation are based on a certain type of variables (i.e., certain primitive type or
string type of variables in initialization methods) instead of certain methods (i.e., source
methods). So in addition to method matching, identity generation requires an additional
checking on method parameters. Second, the identity propagation is field-insensitive through
certain methods (e.g., initialization methods, setter methods). For example, in an identity
setter method, an identity taint propagates from the method parameter directly to the
receiver object rather than to the class field that is assigned by the taints in the setter method.
To address such difference, we feed predefined knowledge (e.g., initialization methods and
parameters of entities) to help EnMobile perform identity propagation according to the
high-level semantics.
4.4.2 Augmenting with Provenance Information
We omit the description of extracting flow facts through entity references given that this
process is a standard information-flow analysis. In this section, we illustrate how we augment
the extracted flow facts with provenance information in two steps.
1URL is used to initialize a new HttpURLConnection object in the implementation of
HttpURLConnectionImpl.
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Figure 4.8: Malicious server configures TrickMe to perform click frauds
Classifying the type of information flows. In this step, we classify the type of flows
based on the three types of data flows defined in Section 5.3. To differentiate the type
of data flows, EnMobile needs to track which parameter of the sink method is tainted
in the computation. EnMobile first performs traditional information flow analysis and
takes the computed flows and sink variables as input, and checks them with the predefined
method signatures to determine whether the information flow is transmit, config, or initiate.
EnMobile takes lists of method signatures that contain the information of transmit, config,
and initiate parameters in the methods. For each information flow, EnMobile derives the
flow type based on the sink variable that the information flows into. For example, in the
SmsManager.sendTextMessage method, the first parameter (destinationAddress) indicates
that the flow is a config flow, and the third parameter (text) indicates that the flow is a
transmit flow.
Computing control-flow predicates. To connect Event Vtrigger to Target Entity etarget,
we first locate the security-sensitive method called by references of etarget. Each security-
sensitive method corresponds to an action of the entity (e.g., SEND for sendTextMessage).
Then, we analyze the call path’s entrypoints that lead to the method calls. The entrypoints
are the top nodes in the call graph of the app. EnMobile follows the inter-component
communications to link the Etarget’s method call to the entrypoints, and the events Etrigger
can be further inferred from the entrypoints.
To compute control dependencies among entities. EnMobile tracks information flows from
entities to conditional statements through inter-procedure control-flow graphs. The value
of a conditional statement decides which program branch to take in runtime executions,
and thus decides invocations of methods on one of the program branches. For a given
method M invoked by an entity etarget (M corresponds to Action A), EnMobile computes
the information flows from all entities to conditional statements (that control the invocations
of M). If an information flow from an entity econtrol to the conditional statements exists,
then econtrol controls the Action A of etarget (i.e.,Control (econtrol, etarget, A) holds).
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Table 4.3: Differentiating Malware and Benign Apps
Apps #T #AE #AA
EnMobile(%) Base1(%) Base2(%) Appo(%)
M. B. M. B. M. B. M. B.
Benign 2716 1717 1592 1.0 99.0 0.9 99.1 4.8 95.2 59.1 40.9
Malware 5098 4897 4062 97.2 2.8 92.2 7.8 97.3 2.7 67.6 32.4
#T: Total #apps; #AE: #apps analyzable by EnMobile; #AA: #apps analyzable by Apposcopy
M.: % analyzed apps. predicted as malicious; B.: % analyzed apps. predicted as benign
4.4.3 Matching Against Signatures
To perform malware detection, EnMobile compares the set of flow facts P(M) extracted
from an app M , using the aforementioned analysis, against a pre-compiled library of signa-
tures of known malware. Specifically, for a malware signature S (as a set of predicates) from
the malware library, the comparison checks whether the predicates in S are a subset of the
flow facts (also as a set of predicates) in P(M), modulo renaming of variables. In the pro-
cess of signature matching, EnMobile enumerates all feasible combinations of the segmented
flows to match the end-to-end characterizations in the signatures. EnMobile determines the
feasibility of combinations of segmented flows by incorporating the flow-sensitive information
(i.e., taking into account the order of the statements) in the extracted flow facts. For exam-
ple, in Figure 4.8, for the flow from ESource to ESink to occur, the flow 1© from URLConnection
to InputStreamReader must precede flow 2© from FileReader to FileOutputStream, which
must precede flow 3© from FileReader to AdActivity. Basically, whether two flows can be
connected depends on the order between the sink of the previous flow and the source of the
next flow (i.e., the read from the entity should happen after the write to the entity).
We simplify this flow stitching problem to a graph reachability problem in which we
transform the inter-procedure control-flow graph into a directed graph. The direction of the
edges represents the order of the execution. For each sink in the computed flows, EnMobile
searches in other flows of the same entity to check whether the sink can reach sources of
these flows. If a source is reachable to the sink, then the flow B that the source belongs
to can be connected with the flow A that the sink belongs to. We name B as a reachable
flow of A. EnMobile maintains a list of reachable flows for each computed flow for further
computation. Note that although EnMobile incorporates the Android lifecycle model into
the flow computations, EnMobile considers only the sequential execution across Android
components (i.e., no clicks on back button) to lower false positives. Also, EnMobile does not
consider constraints on the order of user-event callback methods (e.g., onClick). EnMobile
assumes that user-event callback methods for the same Activity component can be triggered
in any order.
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O. S. O. S.
P.(%) 95.42 76.52 98.47 92.80 97.61 74.48 99.64
R.(%) 97.65 95.15 97.48 89.21 53.46 67.60 97.24
P. = Precision, R. = Recall, O.= Result with Original Training Sample
S.= Result with Smaller Number of Training Sample
4.5 EVALUATION
We evaluate EnMobile in characterizing malware behaviors, by investigating the following
research questions:
RQ1: How effective is EnMobile in characterizing malicious behaviors in existing malware?
RQ2: How do entity-identity analysis and richer data flow predicates in entity-based char-
acterization contribute to the effectiveness of malicious-behavior identification?
RQ3: What is the effectiveness of EnMobile compared to other state-of-the-art approaches
of malware detection?
4.5.1 Evaluation Setup
Evaluation Subjects. Our subject set consists of a malware dataset and a benign app
dataset. Our malware dataset starts with all malware from the Genome [4] and Drebin [15]
malware datasets, which are commonly used in malware detection research [65, 25, 66, 73,
22, 28]. The Malware Genome dataset comprises 1, 260 malware samples organized into 49
malware families and the Drebin dataset comprises 5, 560 malware samples organized into
178 malware families. We remove families containing fewer than 20 malware samples as well
as malware samples duplicated across Genome and Drebin, yielding 27 families with 5, 098
malware samples in total. To collect benign apps, we download a total of 2, 700 apps (100
randomly selected apps for each of the 27 categories) from Google Play, as of December 2016.
We implement EnMobile using several third-party static analysis frameworks, including
Soot [94], FlowDroid [14], and AppContext [28]. To isolate and remove the effects of potential
limitations of these frameworks on our conclusions, we further pre-run EnMobile on the
complete subject set and filter out any apps that cause any of the third-party frameworks to
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throw exceptions or time out. This step gives us a final analyzable dataset of 4897 malware
samples and 1717 benign apps.
Given the large number of unanalyzable benign apps (999), we reassess the distribution
of our final benign app dataset. We find that it retains 52 to 77 apps in each Google Play
category (originally 100); the size range (42KB to 51, 192KB) of a final app’s file and the
size range (16KB to 8, 829KB) of a final app’s classes.dex file (bytecode without resource
files) remain the same compared to the original dataset. This distribution suggests that our
benign app dataset remains broadly representative of real benign apps even after removing
unanalyzable apps. All runs of EnMobile have been performed on a desktop with 4 Intel
Xeon 3.2 GHz E3-1225 processors and 16 GB of memory with a timeout of 20 minutes per
app (the same default timeout set by Apposcopy [25]).
Malware Signature Library. For the purpose of this evaluation, we develop a library
of malware signatures, one per family, for each of the 27 malware families (Table 4.5) in
our dataset. For each malware family, we develop a signature characterizing that family in
the signature language introduced in Section 4.3.1 using a small set of malware samples and
benign apps. For a given malware family, this set consists of 10 randomly selected malware
samples from the family and 100 randomly selected benign apps. To compose the malware
signature, we first collect the security-sensitive behaviors (i.e., data-flow and control-flow
facts) that commonly exist in the malware samples and then remove the behaviors that
match with benign behaviors. The signature-creation procedure entails fewer than six man-
hours of effort per new malware signature, as a one-time effort for each malware family.
4.5.2 RQ1: Entity-Based Characterization
To evaluate the effectiveness of EnMobile’s entity-based characterization on our malware
dataset, we run EnMobile on all malware samples and benign apps except those that we
used to develop the malware signatures, and perform two evaluations.
In the first evaluation, we record which malware family signatures (if any) each app
matches2. Ideally, each malware sample should match its family’s signature and no other
signatures. Note that this classification problem is qualitatively harder than simply classify-
ing a given app as malware or benign, and the true test of the accuracy of a signature-based
approach, such as EnMobile. Column “EnMobile” in Table 4.5 shows the results of this
evaluation. Here, for a given malware family, false negative rate (FN) refers to (among all
samples in the malware family) the percentage of malware samples that are not matched
2Despite being theoretically possible, no apps end up matching multiple signatures in our current evalu-
ation.
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by EnMobile to that family’s signature. Conversely, false positive (FP) refers to (among all
benign apps and malware of other families) the percentage of apps that are (incorrectly)
matched by EnMobile to this family’s signature. As shown in Table 4.5, EnMobile can
effectively classify malware instances into their appropriate families with on average 2.2%
false negatives and around 0.05% false positives (shown as 0.1% in the table due to limited
significant digits). For most malware families, EnMobile has under 5% false negatives and
0.1% false positives.
The second evaluation assesses the effectiveness of EnMobile and other approaches, in
broadly differentiating malware from benign apps (vs. the family-based classification in
Table 4.5), i.e., classifying malware as malware (vs. benign) and benign apps as such (vs.
malware). As shown in columns “EnMobile” in Table 4.3, here too EnMobile performs quite
well, correctly classifying over 97% of the malware and 99% of the benign apps. Further on
manually inspecting the 1% (i.e., 17 out 1717) benign apps being classified as malware, we
find that 8 apps actually possess malicious or highly suspicious behaviors. For example, a
popular app (com.genericsnippet.funnyecards) contains code to download/execute payload
from an unknown server3 and contains a potentially unwanted library (MobClix). The other 9
benign apps misclassified by EnMobile contain some interesting suspicious-looking behaviors;
for example, an app that turns a deprecated smartphone into a baby camera, sending SMS to
parents whenever the phone signal changes. In future work, we plan to use app descriptions
to check whether such suspicious behaviors are in fact desirable.
4.5.3 RQ2: Entity Identities and Flow Predicates
Two of the key contributions of EnMobile are (1) its entity-based characterization, built
on top of entity-identity analysis (Section 4.4.1), and (2) the rich set of data-flow predicates
(Section 4.3.1) to identify malicious intents. In this evaluation, we assess the effectiveness
of these specific features by comparing EnMobile against two baseline versions: EnMobile
without entity-identity analysis (Base1), and EnMobile without rich data-flow types (Base2).
Note that the core information flow analysis in both Base1 and Base2, and indeed in EnMobile
itself, is at least as precise as the type and/or API-based information flow analysis in previous
work [65, 25, 14, 20, 22], albeit implemented in our own framework.
EnMobile without entity identities (Base1 ). To realize Base1, we turn off the entity-
identity analysis in EnMobile. Specifically, the analysis retains the type of the entities, but
ignores the identities of the entities in the flows. Note that we still need to perform identity
3We find that the app removes this behavior in its recent versions, potentially confirming this behavior
as malicious or unwanted.
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propagation to some extent to infer the entity type for some entity references. Of course,
without entity identities, stitching segmented information flows cannot be performed either.
For fair comparison, we also modify EnMobile’s malware signature library to make it
suitable for Base1. Specifically, in each of the signatures, we remove entity identities but
retain entity types. Further, we study malware reports from major anti-virus vendors as
well as flows extracted by EnMobile to identify (segmented) information flows common to a
majority of the samples in a malware family. We replace the original data-flow predicates,
representing a connected flow in the signature, with a set of predicates representing each of
the segmented flows. When no flows match a majority of the malware samples, we use flows
with the best (highest) match.
Table 4.5 (evaluating characterization of malware by family) and Table 4.3 (evaluating
basic malware detection of malware vs. benign) show a comparison of EnMobile (column En-
Mobile in both tables) to Base1 (column Base1). The results show that Base1, i.e.,EnMobile
without entity identities, produces more false negatives for most malware families (7.1% on
average vs. 2.2% for EnMobile) as well as in overall malware detection (7.8% vs. 2.8% in
Table 4.3).
One main reason is that different samples in a malware family typically have different im-
plementations of the same end-to-end flow through varied sets of segmented flows. Without
the benefit of the entity-identity analysis, and the flow stitching that it enables, no single
signature can characterize all samples of a malware family, even with the preceding custom
retrofitting of the signature library for Base1. These results demonstrate the benefit of our
entity-identity analysis for accurate malware characterization.
EnMobile without types of data flows (Base2 ). To realize Base2, we simply
represent the three types of data flows as a single basic information flow, in both the
signatures and in the extracted flow facts for each app. We then perform signature matching
based on the extracted flow facts and signatures.
As shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.3, Base2 produces more false positives for some malware
families and incorrectly marks more benign apps as malware than EnMobile (4.8% vs. just
1% in Table 4.3). The reason is that the signatures lacking our provenance information incur
wrong matching of data flows. For example, the analysis may match a Transmit flow (e.g., a
flow sending an SMS) with a possible Config flow (e.g., flows specifying the SMS recipient’s
number).
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4.5.4 RQ3: Comparison with Related Approaches
We compare EnMobile with three related state-of-the-art approaches: one signature-
based approach (Apposcopy [25]) and three learning-based approaches (MUDFLOW [65],
AppContext [28], and Drebin [15]).
Comparison with a signature-based approach (Apposcopy). Apposcopy leverages
a list of manually-specified signatures (e.g., Figure 4.5) to match malware samples. Because
Apposcopy provides signatures for only several malware families in our dataset, we use the
following methodology to generate the best possible Apposcopy signatures uniformly for all
malware families. We generate Apposcopy signatures for each family by two means: (i)
we follow the same procedure as in creating EnMobile’s signatures to manually create the
signature based on 10 malware samples and 100 benign samples; (ii) We run Astroid [68], an
automatic signature generator for Apposcopy, 10 times for each family. Each time Astroid
randomly selects five samples from the malware family and produces a signature. We pick the
best signature (in terms of the least total number of FP and FN) from among the preceding
11 signatures to report the results. All runs of Apposcopy are on the same machine as
EnMobile with the same timeout threshold per app (20 minutes).
The last two columns (“Appo”) of Tables 4.5 and 4.3 report the results of Apposcopy
in detecting malware. As shown in Table 4.5, Apposcopy performs much worse than En-
Mobile for most of the malware families, especially the malware families whose most mal-
ware samples are from the Drebin malware database. Such effectiveness worsening is likely
due to the evolution of malware. For example, in the Kmin malware family, the function-
ality of a receiver com.km.HoldMessage in some malware samples is replaced by a service
com.km.charge.CycleServic in some other malware samples. This kind of evolution changes
the type of the Android component hosting the malicious behavior. Such changes can easily
evade Apposcopy’s detection because Apposcopy’s signatures heavily rely on the internal
component structure (including a component’s type) to characterize malware. However, En-
Mobile does not suffer from the same issue because such structural changes do not affect the
end-to-end communications among entities.
Another issue that we observe by investigating the FN and FP produced by Apposcopy
is that Apposcopy fails to characterize the essential malicious behavior shared across all
samples in a malware family. For example, in the Jifake malware family, the only flow
expressed through Apposcopy’s signature is sending the current system time through SMS.
However, some malware samples in Jifake do not possess such behavior. In fact, the behavior
of installing another app is universal in this malware family. The incapability of Apposcopy
to characterize such installation behavior results in high false negatives in this malware
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family.
Comparison with learning-based approaches. We also compare EnMobile with
state-of-the-art learning-based detection approaches: AppContext [28], Drebin [15], and
MUDFLOW [65].
Both AppContext and Drebin require a large number of malware samples as training data
to train a machine learning model, but many malware families have very few known samples
(only 42% of malware families have more than 5 samples [68]). So in addition to evaluate
AppContext and Drebin4 following traditional ten-fold cross-validations (O. in Table 4.4),
we also evaluate their effectiveness on a smaller training set (S. in Table 4.4) by following
the evaluation methodology used in Astroid [68]. Following such evaluation methodology,
instead of training malware from all families as a whole, we perform the training and testing
family by family. For each malware family, the training set consists 10 randomly selected
samples from the family, all samples from other malware families, and a similar number of
benign apps as in the original training set. The testing set consists of the rest of samples
from the malware family and the rest of benign apps. We report the average results of all
families in Table 4.4).
MUDFLOW detects malware by identifying abnormal information flows for each category
of sensitive sources. To produce the input that MUDFLOW accepts, we use FlowDroid [14]
to extract information flows from all of our subjects. We feed the extracted information
flows with the SUSI category [47] of sources and sinks of these information flows and the
permission list of each app to MUDFLOW to compute the final result.
Table 4.4 shows the effectiveness of the existing approaches and EnMobile. As shown in the
table, EnMobile outperforms all the existing approaches. Note that although AppContext
and Drebin reach similar effectiveness as EnMobile when training with the original dataset
(i.e., 90% training data and 10% testing data), their effectiveness downgrades a lot when
using a smaller number of training samples. This result is especially impressive for EnMobile,
considering that the difference between the smaller and original training datasets comes from
much reduced malware samples in a single malware family. The downgrade indicates the
overfitting nature of these learning-based approaches. Such result suggests that EnMobile
can be a great substitute for learning-based approaches for malware detection when security
analysts have access to only a small number of malware samples. EnMobile also outperforms
MUDFLOW by much higher recall. The advantage of EnMobile over MUDFLOW lies in
4Since Drebin is not open source, we leverage the public feature vectors of 2,742 malware and 58,097
benign apps produced by Drebin to evaluate the effectiveness of Drebin in detecting malware. To establish
a fair comparison, we randomly select feature vectors of 3,000 benign apps to make Drebin’s dataset possess
similar distribution (i.e., percentages of malware and benign apps) as our dataset.
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detecting those malware samples that have C&C behaviors or behaviors of dynamic code
loading (e.g., BaseBridge). Because of the dynamic nature of such behaviors (i.e., the loaded
code is unknown before the execution), traditional information-flow analysis often fails to
detect these behaviors. Via the entity-based characterization, EnMobile can accurately
identify the controlling entity of the downloading behavior and the command-and-control
nature of the malware. Thus, EnMobile can outperform the existing approach by accurately
identify these malware samples without requiring to know the details of dynamically loaded
code.
4.6 DISCUSSION
Limitations. Intentional obfuscations of the entity identity may sabotage our analysis.
For example, creating an alias entity by using symbolic links (e.g., Ink, Shortcut), or us-
ing different copies of the same encryption scheme to encrypt the entity identity. In these
cases, the malware may evade detection of EnMobile. However, since these camouflage at-
tempts have clear patterns and are likely to be suspicious, other techniques such as dynamic
analysis [95] can be used to complement EnMobile. Attackers can also hide malicious be-
haviors matched by our signature into dynamic loaded code to evade EnMobile’s detection.
However, security analysts can leverage EnMobile to further characterize the behaviors of
dynamic code loading to detect the evolved malware. In our evaluation, signatures char-
acterizing dynamic code loading can successfully match malware of corresponding families
(e.g., basebridge).
Threats of Validity. The tuning of malware signatures could affect the results of the
evaluation. To prevent EnMobile’s signatures from being overfitting for our subjects, when
constructing the malware signatures, we strictly constrain ourselves in analyzing no more
than 10 malware samples per family. Also, EnMobile is based on behavioral signatures
rather than syntactic structures used in much of previous work [25, 15], and doing so further
mitigates against overfitting. To avoid creating unfair signatures for Apposcopy, we further
use Astroid [68] to generate signatures with different numbers of malware samples as input.




We have presented EnMobile, a novel approach for accurately characterizing mobile apps’
interactions with entities. We have demonstrated a practical application of EnMobile for
detecting malware. Our results suggest the effectiveness of EnMobile in characterizing differ-
ential characteristics of malware and benign apps, and robustness of EnMobile’s specification-
driven signature (i.e., based on intrinsic definitions of malware) over implementation-driven
ones (i.e., based on features of low-level program structures). We envision a number of
applications of EnMobile: with increasing uses of IoT apps, EnMobile can be extended for
characterizing broader interactions between the physical world and apps; for human-assisted
app auditing, entity-based characterization can enhance security analysts’ understanding of
app behaviors.
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Table 4.5: Categorization of Malware by EnMobile
Malware Family #T
EnMob(%) Base1 (%) Base2 (%) Appo(%)
FN FP FN FP FN FP FN FP
ADRD 91 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 0.0
AnserverBot 184 0.6 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0
BaseBridege 331 10.4 0.2 33.4 0.2 10.4 0.5 50.0 0.1
Boxer 27 0.0 0.2 7.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 25.9 0.4
DroidDream 97 0.0 0.1 4.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 3.1 8.5
DroidDreamLight 46 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
DroidKungFu 668 1.8 0.0 5.1 0.0 1.6 0.7 8.1 0.0
ExploitLotoor 70 10.4 0.1 17.9 0.1 10.4 0.4 85.0 1.9
FakeDoc 132 2.3 0.1 11.0 0.1 2.4 0.2 6.3 0.3
FakeInstaller 925 1.8 0.0 5.8 0.0 1.8 0.1 68.4 0.1
FakeRun 61 0.0 0.1 4.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 11.1 0.0
Gappusin 58 8.6 0.0 12.0 0.0 8.6 0.1 58.6 0.0
Geinimi 94 0.0 0.2 4.4 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
GingerMaster 342 3.8 0.1 7.1 0.1 3.8 0.2 70.4 0.0
GoldDream 70 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0
Hamob 28 4.5 0.0 18.1 0.0 4.5 0.0 3.7 5.7
Iconosys 152 0.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.6 0.2 69.7 0.0
Imlog 43 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.7 29.1
Jifake 29 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.5
KMin 148 3.7 0.1 5.9 0.1 3.7 0.1 34.7 19.1
MobileTx 69 0.0 0.1 8.8 0.1 0.0 0.6 31.9 0.0
Opfake 613 0.8 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.8 0.1 33.7 19.2
Pjapps 58 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Plankton 625 2.1 0.0 3.7 0.0 2.1 0.2 32.1 3.0
SendPay 59 6.9 0.0 8.6 0.0 6.9 0.0 22.4 7.9
SMSreg 41 0.0 0.0 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 16.2 44.6
YZHC 37 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 5.2
Average 188.8 2.2 0.1 7.1 0.1 2.2 0.2 29.5 5.4
#T = Total number of apps, EnMob = Enmobile, Appo = Apposcopy
FN = False negative rate, Base1 = EnMobile without entity identity
FP = False positive rate, Base2 = EnMobile without data-flow types
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CHAPTER 5: MALWARE DETECTION IN ADVERSARIAL SETTINGS:
EXPLOITING FEATURE EVOLUTIONS AND CONFUSIONS IN MOBILE
APPS
5.1 OVERVIEW
To fight against malware, a signature-based technique extracts malicious behaviors as sig-
natures (such as bytecode or regular expression) while a more complicated machine-learning-
based technique learns discriminant features from analyzing semantics of malware. One ma-
jor challenge for both signature-based and learning-based malware detection approach is to
form an informative feature set for signature or detection model. To address challenge, ex-
isting malware detection tends to include as many features as possible. For example, Drebin,
a recently published malware detection work [15], uses the feature set containing 545,334
features. Recent study [16] shows that such large feature set has numerous non-informative
or even misleading features. Therefore, in this chapter, we investigate the question: can a
malware be mutated to evade detection by changing its feature values while maintaining its
malicious behaviors1? More formally, we name such “mutations of malware based on feature
values” as Malware Recomposition Variation (MRV).
A key observation made in our research is that, features, which abstract concrete malicious
behaviors, are fragile, and they could be easily mutated (i.e., changed). The susceptibility
of such features makes it possible to evade detection if malware are properly mutated [96,
97, 98]. Our research suggests that features that are unique to malware are not necessary
needed for forming malicious behaviors. Such result is mainly due to two factors.
First, learning-based detectors often confuse non-essential features (i.e., features that are
not essential for forming malicious behaviors) in code clones as discriminative features. Copy-
paste practice is prevalent in malware industry which result in many code clones in malware
samples [74]. Because the same code has appeared in many malware instances, learning-
based detectors may regard non-essential features (e.g., minor implementation detail) in
code clones as major discriminant factors (because the same pieces of code appeared in many
malware samples but not in benign apps). Learning-based detector place higher weight on
these features not because these features are essentail to malicious behaviors but because
these features appeared in malware much more frequently than in benign apps. Adversaries
could simply leverage such fact to mutate some of these non-essential features with higher
weight in detecting model to evade detection.
1We define malicious behaviors as the invocations of security-sensitive method calls in malware,
more specifically the invocations of permission-protected methods in Android.
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Second, the features essential to malicious behaviors are different for each malware family.
Almost all existing learning-based malware detection using a universal feature set to detect
malicious samples for all malware families. However, based on recent research result [99]
mined from 1,068 research papers and malware documents, each malware family associates
with a distinct set of malware behaviors and concrete features. Using a universal set of
features for all malware families would result in a large number of non-essential features
to characterize each family. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, if these non-essential
features are unique in some malware samples, the trained detection model can be evaded by
mutation the value of the non-essential features.
In this work, we focus on synthesizing mutation strategies (i.e., what kind of features we
should mutate to evade detection) and automating program transformation (i.e., how to
apply mutations on malware bytecode to ensure the robustness of the app while preserving
malicious behaviors). Different from existing work [96, 97, 98], we explore the capability
of attackers in a more realistic attacking scenario: the attackers can feed any app as the
input to the detector and know the binary detection result (i.e., detected as malware or not)
without any additional information.
There are three major challenges to conduct MRV.
Evading Malware Detectors. To evade a malware detection model, an adversary
need to identify the non-essential features and compute the mutated feature value that
can evade detection. This usually requires an adversary to possess internal knowledge and
understanding of malware detectors. Unfortunately, generally an adversary may have little
(or even no) knowledge about the malware-detection model (such as features and algorithms).
Moreover, the particular knowledge to a single malware-detection model is too specific and
conducting MRV is unlikely to succeed, especially if the model (e.g., the one in VirusTotal)
is based on combining multiple techniques.
Preserving Malicious Behaviors. The mutated malware should maintain the original
malicious purposes and therefore simply converting malware’s feature values to another app’s
feature values is likely to break the malicious . For example, the malicious behaviors are
usually designed to be triggered under certain contexts (to avoid user attention and gain
maximum profits [28]), and the controlling logic of the malware is too sophisticated (e.g.,
via logic bombs and specific events) to be changed.
Maintaining the Robustness of Apps. The mutated malware should be robust enough
to be installed and executed in mobile devices. Automatically mutating an app’s feature
values is likely to break the code structures and therefore cause the app to crash at runtime.
To tackle these challenges, MRV employs two mutation strategies, Malware Evolution






Figure 5.1: A feature vector space V , the feature vectors of existing benign apps B, the feature
vectors of existing malware M , the feature vectors can be detected by detection model D, the
feature vectors of all potential malware M ′ and their relationships.
ity of a detection technique to the mutations of malware feature values. To applying the
mutation strategies without breaking the dependencies and functionalities in the program,
we develop a new technique, inspired by program transplantation [100] to reuse the exist-
ing implementations of desired features instead of randomly mutating or synthesizing the
code. In particular, we develop a transplantation framework capable of inter-method, inter-
component, and inter-app transplantation2. By leveraging the existing implementations, this
technique enables systematic and automatic mutations on malware samples while aiming to
produce a well-functioning app.
Main Contributions. This work makes the following main contributions.
• Observation. We identify differentiability of selected features and robustness of detec-
tion models as two fundamental limitations of malware detection, from which we demonstrate
the feasibility of producing effective attacks (Sec. 5.2).
• Attacks. We propose malware recomposition variation (MRV) to produce two attack
types (feature evolution attack and feature confusion attack) to effectively mutate existing
malware for evading detection (Sec. 5.4).
• Framework. We develop a transplantation framework capable of inter-method, inter-
component, and inter-app transplantation to automatically mutate app features (Sec. 5.5).
5.2 MRV DESIGN
5.2.1 Limitations of Malware Detection
MRV leverages two fundamental limitations of malware detection: differentiability of
selected features and robustness of detection model. To better illustrate the limitations,
we model the vector space of features used by any given malware-detection technique as V
(shown in the Venn diagram in Figure 5.1).
2Transplanting a feature in one app/component/method (i.e., donor) to a different app/compo-
nent/method (i.e., host).
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1 public class User extends Application{
2 public String androidid;
3 public String tel;}
Figure 5.2: User class of DougaLeaker malware
The differentiability of selected features can be represented by the intersection of the
feature vector space (denoted as B) for the existing benign apps and that (denoted as M) of
the existing malware. In an ideal case, if the selected features are perfect (i.e., all differences
between benign apps and malware are captured by features), no malware and benign apps
should be projected to the same feature space, i.e., B ∩M = ∅. Such perfect feature set,
however, is difficult or even impossible to get in practice. For example, to detect a malware
that loads a malicious payload at runtime, a malware detector could use the name of the
payload file as a feature for the detection. Unfortunately, the name of the payload file can be
easily changed to a common file name used by benign apps to evade the detection, therefore
resulting in false negatives. If the detector removes such a feature in fighting malware,
the detector produces false positives by incorrectly catching benign apps that may have
behaviors of dynamic code loading. In either way, the selected feature set is imperfect to
differentiate such malware and benign apps.
The robustness of a detection model can be represented by the difference between the
feature vectors (denoted as M ′) of all potential malware and the feature vectors (denoted as
D) that can be detected by the detection model3. Such difference can be denoted as M ′ \D.
A perfect detection model should detect all possible malicious feature vectors (i.e., M ′). In
practice, detection models are limited in detecting existing malware because it is hard to
predict the form of potential malware (including zero-day attacks). In this work, we argue
that a robust malware-detection model should aim to detect malware variants produced
through known mutations. Such mutations should employ not only syntactic and semantic
obfuscation techniques, but also feature mutations based on analyzing the evolutions of
malware families.
3We safely assume that for a reasonable malware-detection model, D ⊆ M ′. A reasonable
malware-detection model produces false positives on a benign app only because the feature vector
of the benign app is shared by some malware.
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1 public class MainActivity extends Activity{
2 public void onCreate(android.os.Bundle b){
3 super.onCreate(b);
4 this.requestWindowFeature(1);
5 User u = (User) getApplication();
6 u.androidid = Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(), ”android id”);
7 u.tel = getSystemService(”phone”).getLine1Number();
8 if(isRegisterd(u.androidid)){
9 Cursor cursor = managedQuery(ContactsContract.Contacts.CONTENT URI, 0, 0, 0, 0);
10 while (cursor.moveToNext() != 0) {
11 this.id = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(” id”));
12 this.name = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(”display name”));





17 startService(new Intent(getBaseContext(), MyService.class));
18 }
19 }
20 this.exec post(this.data);}} //sending contacts through HttpPost
Figure 5.3: MainActivity of DougaLeaker malware
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5.2.2 Threat Model
We assume that an attacker has only black-box access to the malware detector under
consideration. Under such assumption, the attacker can feed any malware sample as the
input to the detector and know whether the sample can be detected or not, but the attacker
has no internal knowledge (e.g., detection model, signature, feature set, confidence score)
about the detector. The attacker is capable of manipulating the malware’s binary code,
but has no access to the malware’s source code. We assume that the attacker has access
to the existing malware samples (i.e., samples that are correctly detected by the malware
detector), and the goal of the attacker is to create malware variants with the same malicious
behaviors, but can evade the detection.
5.2.3 Overview of MRV
We propose Malware Recomposition Variation (MRV), the first work that systematically
reconstructs new types of malware using decompositions of features from existing malware
to evade detection. Fig 5.5 illustrates the whole framework used to generate app mutants.
MRV first performs mutation-strategy synthesis (Sec. 5.4) including both feature evolution
attack and feature confusion attack, and then MRV leverages program transplantation to
mutate the existing malware (Sec. 5.5) where program testing and malware detection are
used to find the survival app mutations. Note that MRV is an iterative process. When MRV
finishes the initial round of mutation, the evasive sample set and detected sample set get
updated. The update of evasive samples enable the generation of new mutation strategy
(trough confusion attack). The update of detected samples provides new candidates to
produce evasive malware. Note that the set of evasive samples at the beginning of first of
iteration is empty, MRV generate the initial set of evasive samples through evolution attack,
1 public class MyService extends Service{
2 public int onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int startId){
3 User u = (User) getApplication();
4 String text = ”android id = ” + u.androidid + ”; tel =” + u.tel;
5 Date date = new Date();
6 if(date.getHours>23 || date.getHours< 5 ){
7 android.telephony.SmsManager.getDefault().sendTextMessage(this.number, null, text, null, null);
8 }
9 return;}}



















Figure 5.5: Illustration of mutant construction in evolution MRV. Key steps: (1)
mutation-strategy synthesis; (2) program mutation/feature mutation; (3) program testing.
then iteratively generate new evasive samples through confusion attack.
Feature evolution attack is based on the insight that reapplying the feature mutations
in malware evolution can create new malware variants that may evade detection (i.e., the
feature vectors fall into the area of M ′ \D). As Figure 5.5 shows, the attack mutates feature
values iteratively at each level (following the sequence of temporal feature, locale feature,
and dependency feature).
Feature confusion attack is based on the insight that malware detection usually performs
poorly in differentiating the malware and benign apps with the same feature vector. As
discussed earlier, if we simply mutate malware feature vectors to benign feature vectors (i.e.,
feature vectors in space B), such mutation would generally break or weaken the malicious
behaviors (i.e., turning the malware into benign apps). So our design decision is converting
malware with unique malicious feature vectors (i.e., M \ (B ∩M)) to possess the feature
vectors shared with benign apps (i.e., B ∩ M). Because some malware already possess
such feature vectors, we could leverage the program transplantation technique to transplant
the existing implementation to the host malware. Using program transplantation greatly
decreases the likelihood of breaking the original malicious behaviors in the host malware.
Instead of mutating an individual feature value iteratively at each level, feature confusing
attack mutates the whole feature vector.
Use Cases. Although we present our techniques as attacks to malware detection, the
techniques can also be used in assisting the assessment or testing of existing malware-
detection techniques, to enable the iterative design of a detection system. The main idea
is to launch feature evolution attack and feature confusion attack on each revision of the
detection system, so that security analysts can further prune their selection of features in the
next revision. Feature evolution attack can be used to evaluate the robustness of a detection
model. The more robust the detector model is (i.e., the larger D is), the more difficult for
63
1 public class User extends Application{
2 public String androidid;
3 public String tel;}
Figure 5.6: User class of DougaLeaker malware
1 public class MainActivity extends Activity{
2 public void onCreate(android.os.Bundle b){
3 super.onCreate(b);
4 this.requestWindowFeature(1);
5 User u = (User) getApplication();
6 u.androidid = Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(), ”android id”);
7 u.tel = getSystemService(”phone”).getLine1Number();
8 if(isRegisterd(u.androidid)){
9 Cursor cursor = managedQuery(ContactsContract.Contacts.CONTENT URI, 0, 0, 0, 0);
10 while (cursor.moveToNext() != 0) {
11 this.id = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(” id”));
12 this.name = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(”display name”));





17 startService(new Intent(getBaseContext(), MyService.class));
18 }
19 }
20 this.exec post(this.data);}} //sending contacts through HttpPost
Figure 5.7: MainActivity of DougaLeaker malware
a mutated malware to evade detection (i.e., the smaller M ′ \D can be). The detail of each
step is elaborated in subsequent sections. Feature confusion attack can be used to evaluate
the differentiability of selected features. The more differentiable a feature is, the less the
opportunity is for a malware to confuse the detector (i.e., smaller B ∩M is desirable).
5.3 RTLD FEATURE MODEL
In this work, we characterize semantic features using our proposed RTLD feature model,
which aims to reflect the essential malicious behaviors while balancing between the compu-
tational efficiency and accuracy. The RTLD feature model is a general model summarizing
the essential features (i.e., security-sensitive resources) and contextual features (e.g., when,
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where, how the security-sensitive resources are obtained and used) commonly used in mal-
ware detection.
The RTLD model covers four main aspects: Resource (what are the security-sensitive
resources obtained by malicious behaviors), Temporal (When are the malicious behaviors
triggered), Locale (Where do the malicious behaviors occur), and Dependency (How are the
malicious behaviors controlled).
We use the simplified code snippet of the DougaLeaker malware4 shown in Figure 3.1
to illustrate the feature model. The code snippet shows two malicious behaviors of the
DougaLeaker malware. First, the malware saves the Android ID and telephone number of
the victim device to global class User when the app starts (Lines 5-7 in Figure 4.2). Then,
the malware reads the contacts on the victim device (Lines 8-13 in Figure 4.2) and sends the
contacts to a malicious server (Line 20 in Figure 4.2). The malware also starts a service that
sends the Android ID and telephone number to the malicious server through text messages
between 11PM and 5AM.
The resource features describe the security-sensitive resources exploited by malicious
behaviors while the dependency features further represent how the malicious behaviors are
controlled. We locate resource features by constructing call graphs and identifying call
graph nodes of the security-sensitive methods (including methods for accessing permission-
protected resources and methods for executing external binaries/commands). We compile
the list of security-sensitive methods based on PScout [46] and construct the call graphs
using the SPARK callgraph algorithm implemented in Soot [101]. The call graphs represent
the invocation relationships between the app’s entrypoints and permission invocations. We
save the entrypoints of the call graphs in this step to trace back to the other features in
4MD5 of the malware is e65abc856458f0c8b34308b9358884512f28 bea31fc6e326f6c1078058c05fb9.
1 public class MyService extends Service{
2 public int onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int startId){
3 User u = (User) getApplication();
4 String text = ”android id = ” + u.androidid + ”; tel =” + u.tel;
5 Date date = new Date();
6 if(date.getHours>23 || date.getHours< 5 ){




Figure 5.8: MyService of DougaLeaker malware
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later steps. For the DougaLeaker example, we can locate the HttpPost method invocation
(not shown in Figure 3.1) in exec post and sendTextMessage method invocation (Line 7 in
Figure 5.8) in onStartCommand in the call graph. Due to space limit, we omit many details
here. For the detailed algorithm that we used for extracting RTLD features, please refer to
our accompanying technical report [102].
The temporal features describe the contexts when the malicious behaviors are triggered.
To extract temporal features, we identify three categories of temporal features based on
the attributes of their entrypoints. (i) For system events handled by intent filters, their
entrypoints are lifecycle methods. The components of the lifecycle methods should have
intent filters specified. (ii) For both system events captured by event-handling methods and
UI events, their entrypoints should be event-handling methods. (iii) For lifecycle events,
their entrypoints are lifecycle methods, and these lifecycle methods have not been invoked
by other events (due to inter-component communication).
The locale features describe the program location where the malicious behavior occurs.
The location of the execution is either an Android component (i.e., Service, Activity and
Broadcast Receiver) or concurrency constructs (e.g., AsyncTask and Handler). Malicious
behaviors get executed when these components are activated. Due to the inter-component
communication (ICC) in an Android program, the entrypoint component of a malicious
behavior could be different from the component where the behavior resides in.
The locale features in general reflect the visibility of a task (i.e., whether the execution
of the task is in the foreground or background) and continuity (i.e., whether the task is
once-off execution or a continuous execution, even after exiting the app). For example, if a
permission is used in a Service component (that has not been terminated by stopService),
then the permission use is running in the background, and also it is a continuous task (even
after exiting the app).
The dependency features describe the control dependencies of the invocation of the ma-
licious behavior. A control dependency between two statements exists if the truth value
of the first statement controls whether the second statement gets executed. Malware fre-
quently leverage external events or attributes to control malicious behaviors. For example,
the DroidDream malware leverages the current system time to control the execution of its
malicious payload. It suppresses its malicious payload during the day but allows the payload
executions at late night when users are likely sleeping.
We construct inter-procedure control-flow graph (ICFG) to extract dependency features.
Based on the ICFG, we construct the subgraphs from each entrypoint to the resource feature
(i.e., security-sensitive method call). For each subgraph, we traverse the subgraph to identify
the conditional statements that the security-sensitive method invocation is control-dependent
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on. The value of a conditional statement is used to decide which program branch to take in
runtime executions, and thus decide whether a security-sensitive method invocation on one
of the program branches can be executed or not. We say that such conditional statement
controls the invocation of the method. Finally, we save the set of extracted conditional
statements as dependency features with the resource features and the corresponding loca-
tion/temporal features. Figure 5.9 shows the ICFG of the onCreate and onStartCommand
methods. As shown in the Figure, the sendTextMessage method in onStartCommand (Line
7) is controlled by the conditional statement on Line 6 in onStartCommand and the con-
ditional statement on Line 8 in onCreate. On the other hand, the exec post method in
onCreate is not controlled by any conditional statement, and thus the security-sensitive
behavior in exec post does not have any dependency feature.
5.4 MUTATION STRATEGY SYNTHESIS
We present our techniques of synthesizing strategies to mutate program features based on
two scenarios: black-box scenario and informative scenario. In black-box scenarios, adver-
saries have no knowledge about malware-detection techniques (e.g., features, models, algo-
rithms). So instead of developing targeted malware to evade specific detection techniques,
we propose a more general defeating mechanism called evolution attack: mimicking and
automating the evolution of malware. Such defeating mechanism is based on the insight that
the evolution process of malware reflects the strategies employed by malware authors to
achieve a malicious purpose while evading detection. In informative scenarios, adversaries
know the type of algorithms used in the detection, and therefore we develop the targeted
attack called confusion attack. The main idea of malware confusion attack is to mimic the
malware that can generally evade detection, i.e., confusing the malware detectors by modi-
fying the feature values that can be shared by malware and benign apps. In implementation,
to find the features that can cause confusion and evolution, we first project all apps to the
RTLD feature spaces) and then we follow the following steps to generate new attacks.
To generate evolution attack, we identify a feature set called evolution feature set. In
the set, each feature is evolved either at intra-family level or inter-family level. For each
feature vector in the evolution feature set, we count the number of evolutions as evolution
weight, where intra-family evolution weight is proportional to the number of evolutions at
intra-family level, and inter-family evolution weight is proportional to that at inter-family
level. The rationale is that if the feature type has already been evolved frequently under
observation, it is more likely to be evolved according to the nature of the law (in biological
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evolution process [103]). 5.
To generate confusion attack, we identify a set of feature vectors that can be projected
from both benign apps and malware as confusion feature set. For each feature in the
confusion feature set, we count the number of benign apps that can be projected to the
feature vector as the confusion weight of the feature vector. The rationale is that if more
benign apps are projected to the feature, it is harder for the malware detector to label the
apps with this feature as malicious.
After the preceding step, in both evolution attack and confusion attack, for each
malware that we aim to mutate, we first check whether the resource feature appears in any
critical feature set, which denotes the evolution feature set in the context of evolution attack
and the confusion feature set in the context of confusion attack, respectively. If a resource
feature R appears in a vector V in the critical feature set, we then mutate the original feature
vector of R to be the same as vector V by mutating the contextual features. A resource
feature could appear in many vectors in the critical feature set. Then we mutate top K
matching vectors ranked by the corresponding evolution or confusion weight. Otherwise,
we leverage a similarity metric 6 to find another resource feature (in the critical feature
set) R′ that is most likely to be executed in the same context as R. Similarly we select
top K vectors (ranked by the corresponding evolution or confusion weight) matching R′ as
the target vectors for mutation. Finally, if any mutated malware passes the validation test
(Section 5.6) and evades detection, then evolution/confusion attack successfully produces a
malware variant given the fact that each malware generally corresponds to multiple mutated
malware. Empirically we set K = 10 in our experiments.
5.5 PROGRAM MUTATION
In this section, we present how MRV mutates existing malware based on synthesized
mutation strategies. The mutation process is essentially a program transformation that keeps
the the malicious behavior (i.e., resource feature) while mutateing the context features. To
mutate the context features, we develop a program transplantation framework that satisfies
two needs: (a) transplanting the malicious behavior to different contexts in the existing
program; (b) transplanting the contextual features from other programs into the existing
contexts. For details of the mutation, please refer to our technical report [102].
5The number labeled in the bottom of each phylogenetic tree denotes the distance between two
nodes. The node could be a leaf node for denoting a malware, and also could be an internal node
for denoting a cluster grouped from its children node. The Hungarian-type algorithm [104] is used
to compute the malware distance based on the RTLD features.




















Figure 5.9: Inter-Procedural Control Flow Graph of DougaLeaker
5.5.1 Transplantation framework
Transplantation is the process that transplants the implementation of a feature (i.e.,
organ) from one app (i.e., donor app) to another app (i.e., host app) [105]. We broaden the
concept of transplantation to components and methods. Transplantation takes four steps:
identification of the organ (i.e., code area that needs to be transplanted), extraction of the
organ, identification of the insertion point in the host and adaption of the organ to the host’s
environment.
In our transplantation framework, we take different strategies based on the type of features
that need to be mutated. On one hand, to mutate the temporal features or locale features
(that are usually simple to solve) of the program, we identify or construct a suitable context
(that satisfies the targeted value of temporal features or locale features) in the existing
program, and then transplant the malicious behavior (i.e., resource feature) to the identified
or constructed location. On the other hand, to alter the dependency features that usually
require sophisticated ways (i.e., specific method sequences) to achieve the desired control,
we transplant the existing implementation of such control (i.e., organ) from a donor app to
the host app.
Such two-strategy design aims to simplify the existing software transplantation problem.
In the first strategy, the transplantation is actually intra-app. We simply save and pass
the unresolved dependency and contextual information (e.g., values of parameters) in the
program via setting the variables and fields global. In the second strategy, although the
transplantation is inter-app, we just need to transplant a program slice that contains a
few dependencies. Such transplantation is lightweight compared to transplanting the whole
implementation of a functional feature in previous work [105]. Intra-app transplantation
is feasible for temporal and locale features because synthesizing a new entrypoint or a new
component within an existing Android program results in little or no impact to other areas of
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the program. Mutation of dependency features requires inter-app transplantation because
synthesizing new dependencies within the program is challenging. The tight coupling of
dependencies brings huge impact to other program behaviors and likely causes the mutated
program to crash.
Note that although temporal features and local features all require the transplantation
of the malicious behaviors, the donor (i.e., area of code) that requires transplantation is
different. The related code of a malicious behavior can be separated as the triggering
part and the execution part. These two parts may not be in the same component. For
example, in Figure 5.9, the malicious behavior of sending text message can be separated as
the triggering part in the OnCreate method of activity component and execution part in
the OnStartCommand method of the service component. To mutate temporal features, the
donor to be transplanted is the triggering part. To mutate locale features, the donor to be
transplanted is the execution part.
We categorize the transplantation based on the locality into three levels: inter-method,
inter-component, and inter-program transplantation, which are illustrated below.
Listing 5.1: Code snippet of mutated DougaLeaker malware
1 public void onClick(View v) {
2 User u = (User) getApplication();
3 u.androidid = Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(), ”android id”);
4 u.tel = getSystemService(”phone”).getLine1Number();
5 if(!isRegisterd(u.androidid)){
6 String text = ”android id = ” + u.androidid + ”; tel =” + u.tel;
7 Date date = new Date();
8 if(date.getHours>23 || date.getHours< 5 ){
9 android.telephony.SmsManager.getDefault().sendTextMessage(MyService.number, null, text,
null, null); } }}
Listing 5.1 shows the mutated code related to the SMS-sending behavior in Figure 3.1.
The mutation strategy consists of two mutations: (i) to mutate the temporal feature from
lifecycle event “entering the app” (i.e., onCreate of MainActivity) to UI event “clicking the




Inter-method translation refers to the migration of malicious behaviors (i.e., resource
features) from a method to another method in the same component. We observe that such
transplantation is commonly performed to mutate the temporal features. For example, the
mutation of temporal feature in Listing 5.1 is inter-method transplantation (Lines 2-5 of
onClick method in Listing 5.1 are transplanted from Lines 5-8 of the onCreate method).
In the case of temporal features, the organ that needs to be transplanted is the entry of the
malicious behavior and its dependencies. The entry of the malicious behavior is the first
node on the call graph path leading to the malicious behavior. For example, startService
is the entry of the SMS sending behaviors. In order to locate the entry of the malicious
behavior, we construct call graphs from the entrypoint of the program (corresponding to
the feature to be mutated) to the malicious method call. We then mark the node directly
connected to the entrypoint on the call graph as the entry of the malicious behavior.
Then, we extract all dependencies related to the entry. To ensure the entry method
to be invoked under the same context (e.g., parameter values), we perform a backward
slicing from the entry method until we reach the entrypoint of the program. For example,
in Figure 5.9, nodes 3-7 and 8 are all dependencies related to the entry (i.e., node 17,
startService). The corresponding statements are the code snippet to be transplanted. Next,
we create an entrypoint method that can provide temporal features that we need. The
entrypoint creation is done by either registering an event handler for system or UI events
or creating a lifecycle method in the component. We also edit the manifest file to register
receiver components for some of system events. For example, in Listing 5.1, we create an
event listener and an onClick method to provide the temporal feature that the mutation
needs.
Finally, we need to remove the organ from donor methods. If some of statements are
dependent on the organ, the removal can cause the donor method to crash. To avoid the
side-effects of the removal, we initialize a set of global variables with the local variables in the
organ. We then replace the original dependencies on the organ by making the statements
dependent on the new set of global variables. We note that in some instances, the host
method is invoked after the donor method, so the set of global variables may not be initialized
when the donor method is invoked. So when replacing the dependencies, we add conditional
statements to check for null to avoid NullPointerException in the donor method. For
example, after transplanting Lines 5-8, we need to remove Line 7 while keeping other lines
because Lines 9-13 are control-dependent on Lines 5-6.
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5.5.3 Inter-component transplantation
The inter-component transplantation migrates malicious behaviors from one component
to another component in the same app. Inter-component transplantation can be used to
mutate the values of temporal features and locale features. For example, the mutation
of the locale feature in Listing 5.1 is inter-component transplantation (Lines 6-9 in the
Activity component in Listing 5.1 are transplanted from Lines 4-7 in the Service component
in Figure 5.8).
Inter-component transplantation follows the same process as inter-method transplanta-
tion except for two differences. First, in addition to temporal features, inter-component
transplantation is also used to mutate locale features. As previously mentioned, to mutate
local features, the organ to be transplanted is the execution part of the code. To extract
such organ, we find the call graph node directly linked by the entrypoint of the execution
part. Note that the entrypoint of the execution part can be different from the entrypoint
of the malicious behavior. For example, in Figure 5.9, the entrypoint of the execution part
is onStart, while the entrypoint of the malicious behavior is onClick. After we locate the
call graph node, the rest of the extraction process is the same.
The other difference of inter-component transplantation is when mutating the locale fea-
ture while maintaining the temporal feature, the regenerator needs to create inter-component
communications to invoke the host method. To avoid crash caused by unmatching intent
messages, the regnerator also adds conditional statements to avoid executing the existing
code in the host method when such inter-component communications occur.
5.5.4 Inter-program transplantation
The inter-program transplantation is used to migrate the dependency feature of a malicious
behavior in the donor app to the host app with identical malicious behavior. The extraction
of the dependency feature is different from migration of the triggering/execution part of the
malicious code. The organ consists of two parts. The first part is the implementation of
the controlling behavior. We first construct the inter-component control flow graph of the
app. Then we compute the subgraph containing all paths from the controlling statement
(i.e., the statement whose value determines the invocation of the malicious behavior) to
the controlled statement (i.e., malicious behavior). Such subgraph essentially represents the
controlling behavior. The second part of the organ is the dependencies of the controlling
statement. To extract these necessary dependencies, we slice backward from the controlling
statement until we reach the entrypoint of the program. We then migrate both parts of the
organ into the host app.
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5.6 TESTING ON MUTATED APPS
We perform testing on mutated apps for two purposes: (a) whether the malicious behaviors
have been preserved; (b) whether the robustness of the app has been mutated.
Checking the preserving of malicious behaviors. We develop two techniques to
assist the testing. First, to simulate the environment where the malicious behaviors are
invoked, we create environmental dependencies by changing emulator settings or using mock
objects/events. By simulating the environment, we can directly invoke the malicious be-
haviors to speed up the validation process. Second, to further validate the consistency of
malicious behaviors when the triggering conditions are satisfied, we apply the instrumenta-
tion technique to insert logging functions at the locations of malicious method invocations.
The logging functions print out detailed information about the variables, functions, and
events invoked after the triggering events. We therefore attain the log files before and after
the mutation under the same context (e.g., the same UI or system events and same inputs).
Then, we automatically compare the two log files to check the consistency of malicious
behaviors.
Checking the robustness of mutated apps. We leverage random testing to check
the robustness of a mutated app. In particular, we use Monkey [106], a random user-event-
stream generator for Android, to generate UI test sequences for mutated apps. Each mutated
app was tested against 5,000 events randomly generated by Monkey to ensure that the app
does not crash 7
5.7 EXPERIMENT
Malware Detection Dataset. Our subject set consists of a malware dataset and a
benign app dataset. Our malware dataset starts with 3,000 malware randomly selected from
Genome [4], Contagio [54], VirusShare [53], and Drebin [15]. We use VirusTotal to perform
sanity checking on the malware dataset (descriptions about signature-based detectors are
provided later in this dissertation). We exclude the apps identified as benign by VirusTotal
from the malware dataset. We also exclude any duplicate apps by comparing SHA1 hashes.
For benign apps, we download the most popular 120 apps from each category of apps in the
Google Play store as of February 2015 and collect 3,240 apps in total. We implement the
process of extracting RTLD features using third-party static analysis frameworks, including
7Due to the limitation of the coverage of random testing, the mutated app passing the testing
step can still be invalid. As future work, we plan to incorporate more intelligence-guided testing
techniques [8, 107] in MRV testing.
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Soot [101] and FlowDroid [100]. To isolate and remove the effects of potential limitations
of these frameworks, we run feature-extraction analysis on the complete subject set and
remove any apps that cause a third-party tool to fail. The filtering gives us a final analyzable
dataset of 1,917 malware and 1,935 benign apps to perform malware detection. Our final
malware dataset consists of 529 malware samples from Genome, 25 samples from Contagio,
287 samples from VirusShare, and 1,076 samples from Drebin dataset. Our final benign
app dataset retains 63 to 96 apps from the original 120 apps in each Google Play category.
All runs of our process of extracting RTLD features, the transplantation framework, and
learning-based detection tools [28, 15] are performed on a server with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU 2.80GH with 38 processors and 80 GB of memory with a timeout of 80 minutes for
each app.
Baseline Approaches. We implement two baseline approaches for comparison with
MRV: Random MRV and OCTOPUS. We first develop a random transformation strategy (Random
MRV) to compare against confusion and evolution attacks. Instead of following the evolution
rules and similarity metrics to mutate the RTLD features, we randomly mutate RTLD
features (i.e., mutate the original feature value to the same-level feature value randomly
selected from the available dataset) and transform the malware samples based on such
mutation. Note that for Random MRV and evolution MRV, we follow the sequence of temporal
feature, locale feature, and dependency feature to apply the transformation at different levels
(Figure 5.5). We choose such sequence because the transplantation goes from inter-method
to inter-app as the level increases in this sequence, likely leading to a higher success rate in
the program transplantation. We leave the exploration on other possible mutation sequences
to our future work.
We also implement a syntactic app obfuscation tool called OCTOPUS similar to Droid-
Chameleon [26]. Specifically, OCTOPUS contains four levels of obfuscation: bytecode-sequence
obfuscation (i.e., repacking, reassembling), identifier obfuscation (i.e., renaming), call-
sequence obfuscation (i.e., inserting junk code, call reordering, and call indirection), and
encryption obfuscation (i.e., string encryption). Then, we apply each level of obfuscation
in OCTOPUS to each malware sample at a time, and perform testing on the sample file
(Section 5.6) after each obfuscation. If the testing passes, we apply the next obfuscation
to the obfuscated sample (resulted from applying the current obfuscation). If the testing
fails, we apply the next obfuscation to the the sample before the current obfuscation (i.e.,
skipping the current obfuscation). In our experiment, all semantic mutations including
Random MRV and evolution/confusion attacks are performed after the syntactic obfuscation
of OCTOPUS.
Malware detectors. We use a number of learning-based and signature-based malware
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Figure 5.10: Detection results of AppContext vs. Drebin on the original dataset (ORI) and
dataset with adversarial samples (MRV) produced by MRV
detectors to evaluate the effectiveness of MRV. For learning-based malware detectors, we
adopt AppContext [28] and Drebin[15]. AppContext leverages contextual features (e.g.,
the events and conditions that cause the security-sensitive behaviors to occur) to identify
malicious behaviors. In our experiment, AppContext generates around 400,000 behavior
rows on our dataset (3,852 apps), where each row is a 679-dimensional behavior vector. We
conservatively label these behaviors (i.e., marking a behavior as malicious only when the
behavior is mentioned by existing malware diagnosis). The labeled behaviors are then used
as training data to construct a classifier. Drebin uses eight features that reside either in the
manifest file or in the disassembled code to capture the malware behaviors. Since Drebin is
not open source, we develop our own version of Drebin according to its description [15].
Although Drebin extracts only eight features from an app, Drebin covers almost every
possible combination of feature values resulting in a very large feature vector space. In fact,
Drebin produces over 50,000 distinct feature values on our dataset (3852 apps). We perform
ten-fold cross-validations to assess the effectiveness of AppContext and Drebin. Figure 5.10
shows the performance of AppContext and Drebin on all subjects in our dataset.
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For signature-based malware detectors, we leverage the existing anti-virus service provided
by VirusTotal. Specifically, we follow the evaluation conducted for Apposcopy [25] to pick
the results of seven well-known anti-virus vendors (i.e., AVG, Symantec, ESET, Dr. Web,
Kaspersky, Trend Micro, and McAfee) and label an app as malicious if more than half of the
seven suggest that the app is malicious. Following such procedure, only malware labeled as
malicious are selected into our malware dataset, and thus all malware in our dataset can be
detected by VirusTotal.
Learning algorithms. In our experiment, we leverage k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN), De-
cision Tree (DT), and Support Vector Machine (SVM) for malware detection in AppContext
and Drebin. For confusion attack, we leverage Random Forest (RF) as the algorithm to
train the substitute model8. The reason for us to use RF is that we want to use a dif-
ferent algorithm from the ones used in malware detection to validate our assumption in
transferability [110].
Malware variants generation. We focus on generating malware variants by detected/-
known malware samples. Among all 1,917 malware samples, 1,739 samples can be detected
by all three detection tools that we used. Because many malicious servers of malware are
blocked, causing malware to crash even before the mutations, we test the 1,739 malware
with 5,000 events randomly generated by Monkey and discard the crashed apps. This step
gives us a final set of 409 valid malware samples to generate malware variants. We then
systematically apply OCTOPUS, evolution/confusion attacks, and Random MRV to all 409 valid
malware samples.
5.8 RESULTS
5.8.1 Defeating existing malware detection
Table 5.1 shows the malware variants generated through transformation of OCTOPUS,
Random MRV, malware evolution attack and confusion attack, and the detection results of
VirusTotal on the variants. We also show the result of the full version of MRV (the combi-
nation of confusion and evolution attack) in the last column (F). Therefore, the full version
includes all malware variants produced by confusion attack and evolution attack. The row
“Transformable malware” refers to the number of malware samples that can be mutated to a
8We optimize the parameter for SVM and DT (we use C4.5 DT [108]) using CVParameterSelection of
Weka [109]. For RF and kNN, we tune the parameters by testing on a sample set (100 malware and 100
benign apps). We set the benign/malware ratio in each subset (of an individual tree) for RF as 3 and K
value for kNN as 7.
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Table 5.1: Number of transformable malware samples and generated malware variants by
different evasive techniques and the detection results
O. R. E. C. F.
Transformable malware 409 121 314 58 341
Generated variants 1008 212 638 58 696
Variants undetected by VirusTotal 125 113 512 53 565
Variants Undetected by AppContext 0 2 97 56 153
Variants Undetected by Drebin 0 111 460 58 518
O. = OCTOPUS, R. = Random MRV, E. = Malware Evolution Attack, C. = Malware Confusion Attack, F. = Full
Version of MRV
valid malware variant (i.e., of all malware variants generated at different levels of an evasive
technique, at least one of the malware variants can pass the testing). The row “Generated
variants” shows the number of generated variants that pass the impact analysis and test-
ing9, and the last three rows10 show the number of variants that can evade the detection of
VirusTotal, AppContext, and Drebin, respectively.
As shown in Table 5.1, although the full MRV generates fewer malware variants than
OCTOPUS (696 vs. 1,008), the full MRV produces much more evasive variants than both
OCTOPUS and Random MRV for all three tools, especially the learning-based tools. This result
indicates that the full MRV is much more effective in producing evasive malware variants
than syntactic obfuscation and random transformation.
We investigate the malware variants produced by the full MRV that can still be detected
by anti-virus software. We find that most variants of this kind contain extra payloads (e.g.,
rootkit, another apk). The anti-virus software can detect them by identifying the extra
payloads because our mutation transforms only the main program.
Although originally Drebin detects more malware samples than AppContext (Figure 5.10),
Drebin performs worse on the full MRV dataset. Given different training malware samples,
the full MRV can consistently make over 60% testing variants undetected by Drebin. One
potential reason could be that AppContext leverages huge human efforts in labeling each
security-sensitive behavior, while Drebin is a fully automatic approach, so overfitting is likely
to occur in Drebin’s model.
We also notice that Random MRV becomes much more effective in evading Drebin than
evading AppContext (AppContext detects almost all variants produced by Random MRV).
The reason lies in the large number of syntactic features used in Drebin. Such result indicates
that although Random MRV is effective in befuddling the syntactic-based detection (e.g., anti-
9The variants are generated at each level, and one malware sample may result in multiple malware
variants.
10For AppContext and Drebin, we show the number of variants that cannot be detected by models based
on all training algorithms.
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Table 5.2: Details of Evolution Attack at each level (undetected vs. all)
Results T. L. D.
Robust variants 178 316 144
Undetected by VirusTotal 77/178 296/316 139/144
Undetected by AppContext 21/178 15/316 61/144
Undetected by Drebin 73/178 272/316 115/144
T. = Temporal Features L. = Locale Features D. = Dependency Features
virus software), it is not effective in evading semantics-based detection techniques.
One noteworthy result is that confusion attack can successfully mutate only 58 malware
samples into working malware variants. The reason is that confusion attack usually requires
mutating more contextual features than evolution features. We observe in our experimental
data that the likelihood of an attack to break the app increases as the number of mutations
in the attack increases. Actually, confusion attack synthesizes more than 1,000 variants,
and most of the variants are unable to run. However, such conversion rate is already high
compared to Random MRV. Random MRV generates more than 320,000 variants, but only 212
of them can run without crashing (and only 2 can evade the detection of AppContext).
Such result suggests that considering the feasibility of an attack is essential in generating
adversarial malware samples.
5.8.2 Effectiveness of attacks at each level
For evolution attack, we also investigate the effectiveness of mutation at each RTLD level.
Table 5.2 shows the detailed detection results of evolution attack at each mutation level.
Table 5.2 shows some interesting observations. For example, for anti-virus software and
Drebin, the level that produces the largest number of evasive variants is on the locale-feature
level, while for AppContext, the level that produces the largest number of evasive variants
is on the dependency-feature level. This result indicates that mutating at the locale-feature
level is more effective for the detectors using syntactic features (e.g., VirusTotal, Drebin),
while mutating at the dependency-feature level is more effective for semantics-based detectors
(e.g., AppContext). Such result also indicates that the transformation sequence used in
the experiment (i.e., temporal-locale-dependency) might not be the most optimal choice to
evade some detectors. Ideally, we can explore different combinations of the mutation levels
to maximize the number of undetected malware samples for each malware detector.
We also observe that most of unsuccessful variants produced at the dependency-feature
level are due to the fact that a malicious behavior cannot be triggered in the simulated
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testing environment. The reason of lacking triggering is that by transplanting conditional
statements from one component/method to another component/method, the internal logic of
the original malware sample is broken. Some of the transplanted conditional statements may
be mutually exclusive with the existing conditions in the code, thus making the malicious
behavior infeasible to be triggered. As an ongoing effort, we plan to leverage a constraint
solver to identify the potential UNSAT conditions when synthesizing mutation strategies.
5.8.3 Strengthening the robustness of detection
We also investigate the possibility of leveraging variants produced by MRV to strengthen
the robustness of detection. We propose the following three techniques.
Adversarial Training. We randomly choose half of our generated malware variants into
the training set to train the model, and put the other half of generated variants into the
testing set to evaluate the model11.
Variant Detector. We create a new classifier called variant detector to detect whether an
app is a variant derived from existing malware. The variant detector leverages mutation
features that are generated from each pair of apps’ RTLD features to reflect the feature
differences between the two apps. The number of mutation features is the same as the
number of RTLD features. The difference is that for any RTLD feature that the two apps
disagree on, the mutation feature (corresponding to the RTLD feature) is the (bidirectional)
mutation between the apps on the RTLD feature. If the pair of apps are derived from same
malware, we label the feature vector as “variant”. Otherwise, we label the feature vector
as “unrelated”. Because only a small portion of all pairs of apps would have a “variant”
relation, the trained model would be biased to the majority class (i.e., the “unrelated” class).
To resolve such issue, we use SMOTE [111] to make both classes to have an equal number
of instances by creating synthetic instances. We then use the trained model on each app
labeled (by malware detectors) as benign. For each of the apps, we create pairs to produce
mutation features by grouping the app with each malware sample in our training set. Then
the trained model determines whether the app is a variant of malware in the training set
based on the mutation features.
Weight Bounding. We constrain the weight on a few dominant features to make feature
weights more evenly distributed. For example, in the case of SVM, we constrain w in the
cost function of SVM:
11We perform ten-fold cross-validation in our experiment to report TP and FP.
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We observe that adversaries can produce evasive malware variants by applying just a few
mutations on dominant features in contrast to many more mutations on other non-dominant
features. Therefore, to locate dominant features, we select all 44 malware variants produced
by fewer than three mutations, and summarize 17 dominant features that enable the produc-
tion of the variants. To compute the specific range of the weight, we put only 44 malware
variants and their original malware samples as malicious samples in the training set, and
record the range value of the weight of the 17 dominant features under different parameters.
We then summarize the constraints in reasonable settings (TPR ≥ 0.80 and FPR ≤ 0.10)
and put the hard constraints in the training phase.
Figure 5.11 presents the detection results of AppContext’s malware detection12. The red
line represents the detection performance on the original dataset, and the purple triangles
represent the detection performance on the dataset with malware variants produced by MRV.
The other three curves represent the detection performance of three proposed protection
12We present only SVM-based model here due to the limited space. Other learning algorithms present
similar patterns as SVM. We leave investigation of specific differences across models as future work.
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Table 5.3: Number of malware samples evading detection of AppContext or Drebin under
different algorithms
Detector ORI. AT. VD. WB.
AppContext 178 125 106 152
Drebin 38 19 8 23
ORI. = Original detection, AT. = Adversarial training
VD. = Variant detection, WB. = Weight bounding
techniques on the dataset with malware variants. As shown in Figure 5.11, all three proposed
techniques can alleviate the MRV attacks. The variant detector technique can reach almost
the same performance as the original malware detector (while being more secure/robust to
malware variants).
To alleviate the concerns that our proposed defenses are overfitting to MRV attacks, we
also investigate whether the trained models can assist detecting not only malware variants
but also unknown malware samples in general. We choose to investigate the malware samples
evading the detection of the original AppContext and Drebin (178 and 38 malware samples
evade the detection, respectively)13. As shown in Table 5.3, all the protection mechanisms
can help detect evasive malware samples, and only eight of the samples can evade the
detection of the variant detector technique.
5.9 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have proposed practical attacks that mutate malware variants to evade
detection. The core idea is to leverage existing malware program structures to change the
features that are non-essential to malware but important to malware detectors. To achieve
this goal, we have presented the MRV approach including static analysis, phylogenetic
analysis, machine learning, and program transplantation to systematically produce new
malware mutations. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first effort toward solving
the malware-evasion problem by altering malware bytecode without any knowledge of the
underlying detection models.
MRV opens up intriguing, valuable venues of applications. First, the proposed attacks can
be used to evaluate the robustness of malware detectors and quantify the differentiability
of features. Second, MRV can help discover potential attack surfaces to assist the iterative
design of malware detectors. Finally, the program transplantation framework (capable of
changing malware features) can be written as a malicious payload within malware and such
13All the numbers are counted when the false positive is within 0.06.
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adaptive malware are valuable for the community to investigate.
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CHAPTER 6: RELATED WORK
Static Analysis for Mobile App. Much work has been proposed to enhance static
analysis on mobile apps [75, 76, 77, 22, 78, 20, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 19, 84, 85]. EnMobile
falls into the general category of information flow analysis. Information flow analysis tracks
whether privacy-sensitive data (i.e., sources) flows to outgoing channels or sensitive outlets
(i.e., sinks). EnMobile complements existing information flow analysis by adding entity-
based characterization to the information flow. AAPL [77] uses enhanced data flow analysis
techniques to increase the number of data flows that can be detected by information flow
analysis and then uses the peer-voting mechanism to low the false positive rate to report
illegitimate information leakages. AAPL fails to handle obfuscation techniques such as
String encryption (by using constant propagation analysis) and produces high false positives
(by matching all sources with all potential sinks). EnMobile resolves these two limitations
by precisely computing the identity of entities. SPARTA [86] and FlowDroid [14] are two
general information flow analysis frameworks. SPARTA enables the flow-policy checking
by providing an integrity type system to annotate source code with information-flow type
qualifiers. FlowDroid is a static taint analysis tool for Android apps based on Soot [87]
and Heros [88]. EnMobile complements SPARTA and FlowDroid by analyzing all types of
data flows to detect malicious behaviors that are not information leakage (e.g., bot-driven
C&C behaviors). HARVESTER [95] is a hybrid analysis that extracts runtime value to
cope with anti-analysis technique (e.g., encryption) in Android apps. EnMobile can leverage
HARVESTER to derive more accurate inference of entity identity by coping with the problem
of reflective method calls.
Characterizing App Behaviors. Existing work uses static analyses to characterize app
behaviors. DroidSift [67] characterizes malicious behaviors via program dependency graphs.
However, malware can obfuscate the program by leveraging the external entities to break a
program dependency graph into pieces. EnMobile can assists DroidSift to reconstruct the
dependency graph from the segmented graphs. Pegasus [112] characterizes the effects of the
event system and API semantics using permission event graphs. EnMobile complements
Pegasus by reflecting the configuring or controlling entities of security-sensitive behaviors.
Mobile Malware Detection. There are mainly two types of techniques: signature
matching and machine learning. For signature matching, a malware detector matches either
a syntactic signature (i.e., a sequence of instructions matched by a regular expression) or
a semantic signature [25] (i.e., control flows or data flows). In our evaluations, we demon-
strate that EnMobile can be used to match entity-based malware signatures (which are
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semantic signatures). For machine learning, existing work leverages techniques such as min-
ing (MUDFLOW [65]) clustering (CHABADA [66]), classification (AppContext [28]), and
natural language processing (AsDroid [73], WHYPER [23]) to detect malicious apps. Our
approach complements existing malware-detection analysis by identifying contexts that indi-
cates the intentions of data uses. There are various approaches that perform analysis to de-
tect malicious behaviors, such as dynamic taint analysis [7, 113], language-based information
flow [114, 115, 116, 117], static analysis [118, 67, 25, 119], and Bayesian classification [120].
However, these approaches are concerned about how privacy-sensitive data protected by
permissions are used, while our approach provides the contexts under which the permissions
are triggered. Future work can also leverage entity-based semantic information extracted by
EnMobile to train classification models to differentiate benign apps and malware.
Contexts of Permission Uses. Besides our work, prior research has leveraged the
contextual information of app behaviors for various security purposes. Pegasus [112] con-
structs permission event graphs using static analysis to model the effects of the event system
and API semantics, and performs model checking to enforce the policies specified by users.
However, specifying these policies requires that users have established knowledge about the
expected behavior/functionality of the app and an understanding of the Android platform.
Our approach complements Pegasus by providing the contexts, which can be used to con-
struct Pegasus’ policies. AppIntent [9] presents a sequence of GUI events that lead to data
transmissions and let analysts decide whether the data transmissions are intended. Their
approaches focuses on GUI events, a kind of user-perceivable contexts that allows analysts
to scrutinize the manipulations of UI components. Although our approach also focuses on
the events that trigger app behaviors, AppIntent handles only app behaviors activated by
GUI events while our approach analyzes a more comprehensive set of contexts (e.g., receivers
and background services) and can complement their approach to handle data transmissions
that are not triggered by sequences of GUI manipulations. Further, our approach focuses on
permission uses rather than data transmissions. Moreover, in addition to the event-handlers
in the code, our approach also extracts the events from Android components’ attributes
in the manifest files, identifying more types of contexts than their approach. AsDroid [73]
detects stealthy app behaviors by identifying mismatches between API invocations and the
text displayed in the GUIs. Our approach focuses on the events that trigger app behaviors
rather than the textual analysis of the GUIs. Since app behaviors can occur without dis-
playing a GUI, the textual analysis of GUIs alone is insufficient to detect all stealthy app
behaviors. DroidAPIMiner [30] identifies malicious apps by performing frequency analysis of
API invocations within a set of benign and malicious apps to extract the features of malware,
and uses machine learning to determine the most relevant features. Our approach focuses
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on what causes security-sensitive API calls to be used rather than the pattern of API calls
that are used. WHYPER [23] examines whether app descriptions provide any justification
for the app’s permission uses. WHYPER focuses on why apps request permissions while our
approach focuses on how apps actually use the requested permissions. Such sentences in the
app description provide explanations for the contexts of permission uses. But WHYPER
cannot provide contexts for permission uses that have not been justified by app descriptions.
Our approach addresses this issue by transforming the permission related behaviors and
contexts into natural-language descriptions. Such descriptions can be used to explain the
unjustified permission usages identified by WHYPER, complementing WHYPER to improve
user-understanding of permission usages.
Studies of Permission Model. Felt et al. [121] perform usability studies to examine
whether users understand the permission warnings. Their results show that user can identify
(part of) the permission definition, but they are confused about the scope of permission.
Users incorrectly believe that a given permission has more capabilities or less capabilities
than it actually has. The context description provided by AppContext could alleviate
the issue to some extent. The description explains the privileges gained by permission
invocations, so users could infer what apps could do by using the permissions. Barrera et
al. [122] leverage the Self-Organizing Map (SOM) algorithm to study how the developers use
the Android permission system in practice. They take 1100 Android apps on the market as
their study subjects, and visualize the study results in U-matrix representation of the SOM
for Android permissions. Their results reveal the correlations between permissions, and the
results also suggest that pairs of permissions are common. Stowaway [123] build a permission
mapping to check whether Android apps follow least privilege with their permission requests.
PScout [46] also build a more complete permission mapping by static analysis of Android
system source code. These studies focus on correlations between permissions and permission
mapping while our studies focus on contextual use of permissions.
Risk Ranking and Certification of Apps. Peng et al. [27] present the risk information
of an app compared to other apps by using probabilistic generative models to calculate risk
scoring of the app. MAST [124] triages Android apps by analyzing features extracted from
the APKs. MAST uses machine learning techniques to measure the correlation between
features and directs malware analysis resources to the apps that have the greater potential
of risks. Kirin [125] performs lightweight certification of apps by identifying dangerous app
configurations against a set of security rules. These approaches leverage various kinds of
features or configurations in apps to identify potential risks. Unlike these approaches that
present the risk scores or ranking for users, our approach analyzes the bytecode of apps to
extract the contexts of permission uses. However, our approach can complement risk ranking
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and certification techniques by providing the extracted permission contexts as another metric
for their evaluation.
Privacy Issues in Mobile Apps. Several efforts try to characterize the current mobile
ad targeting process. MAdScope [126] and Ullah et al. [127] both found that ad libraries have
not yet exploited the full potential of targeting. Our work is driven by such observations
and tries to assess the data exposure risk associated with embedding a library in an app.
Many studies describe alternative mobile advertising architectures. AdDroid [128] enforces
privilege separation by hard-coding advertising functions as a system service into Android
platform. AdSplit [129] achieves privilege separation via making ad libraries and their host
apps run in separate processes. Leontiadis et al. [130] proposes a client-side library compiled
with the host app to monitor the real-time communication between the host app and the ad
libraries to control the exposed information. MobiAd [131] suggests local profiling instead
of keeping the user profiles at the data brokers to protect users’ privacy. Most of these
alternative architectures envision a separation of ad libraries from their host apps. This
would eliminate the in-app attack channels that we demonstrate and constrain the data
exposure to the ad libraries. However, none of these solutions are deployed in practice as
they all disrupt the business model of multiple players in this ecosystem. We take a different
approach by modeling the capabilities of ad libraries in order to proactively assess apps’ data
exposure risk.
There are a number of studies that aim to—or can be used to—detect and/or prevent
current privacy-infringing behaviors in mobile ads. Those works mainly fall into three general
categories: (1) static scanning [132, 133, 134, 135, 136], (2) dynamic monitoring [137, 138,
139, 140], and (3) hybrid techniques using both [141]. A combination of these techniques
could detect and prevent some of the attack strategies of ad libraries we discussed in this
work, if they are adopted in practice. However, such countermeasures can still fail to
protect against all allowed behaviors. For example, TaintDroid [7] and FlowDroid [14]
cannot evaluate the sensitivity of the data carried. Moreover, static code analysis will miss
dynamically loaded code, and code analysis in general cannot estimate the potential reach
of libraries. Further, by merely encrypting local files we cannot prevent libraries within the
same process from using the key the host app uses to decrypt the files. In addition, there is
no mechanism to address data exposure through app bundle information as we reveal in this
work because (1) this is not considered as a sensitive API from AOSP and (2) even if marked
as sensitive it is unclear how access to it by apps and/or libraries should be mediated, as
there are legitimate uses of it. Our focus is not on detecting and tackling current behaviors
but assessing the data exposure given the allowed behaviors. This is critical when trying to
assess the privacy risk of an asset.
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SUPOR [142] and UIPicker [143] seek instances where apps exfiltrate sensitive data.
Like Pluto, they use NLP and machine learning techniques to find data of interest in user
interfaces. Unlike Pluto, their focus is on data like account credentials and financial records,
whereas Pluto is aimed at general targeted data with validation based on data of interest to
advertisers. As with most of the other work in this area, SUPOR and UIPicker seek existing
exfiltration instances rather than allowed instances, although some of their techniques can
facilitate finding allowed instances.
Evasive Malware. Metamorphic malware [144], polymorphic malware [145] and other
obfuscation techniques [146] have been developed to evade malware detection [147]. Semantic
signature [148], behavior graphs [149] and other semantics aware techniques [150], [28], [151]
have been developed to defeat against malware. To study how anti-malware products are
resistant against transformed mobile apps, Droidchameleon [26] is developed as a systematic
framework with various transformation techniques for mobile app study and they found the
transformed apps can easily evade detection. Unlike MRV, DroidChameleon only performs
syntactic obfuscation, which can be easily be detected by semantic-based detection tool
such as AppContext. PraGUARD [152] performs assets encryption on malware samples
to assess the role of external resources (i.e., assets) in the detection for the anti-malware
tools PraGUARD focuses on assessing detection of external resources, while MRV focuses
on assessing detection of apps behaviors. Two approaches focus on different problems,
complementary to each other. Replacement attack [153] is proposed to poison behavior-based
specifications by concealing similar behaviors of malware variants. Replacement attack can
impede malware clustering [154]. MalGene [155] is developed to automatically locate evasive
behavior in system call sequences and therefore extract evasion signatures. Different from
these works, MRV can evade both anti-virus tools and machine learning based classifiers.
Recent evaluations [16] on ML-based malware detection techniques suggest that more
feature number does not necessarily improve the performances due to the non-informative
features [15] and noisy features. Recent study on PDFrate [96] evaluates existing learning-
based malware detection techniques in different evasion scenarios. Xu et al. [97] propose
an evading technique based on classification score feedback that can manipulate PDF mal-
ware samples to evade detection of PDFrate and Hidost. Carmony et al. [98] manipulate
JavaScript payload in PDF malware to evade detections. The major difference between
these works and MRV is that MRV requires much less knowledge about machine learning
model to launch the attack. Moreover, prior work mainly focuses on pdf malware while MRV
automatically generates malware variants for android apps.
Adversarial Machine Learning. Adversarial machine learning [156, 157, 158, 96]
studies the effectiveness of machine learning techniques against an adversarial opponent.
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Adversaries frequently attempt to break many of the assumptions that practitioners make
(e.g., data has various weak stochastic properties; data do not follow a stationary data
distribution). Generally, the adversary is assumed to have full (or partial) information related
to three components of learner: learning algorithm, feature space and training dataset. In
our work, we propose a targeted attack assuming a malware developer knows the information
about the feature space and classifier.
Program Transplantation. We leverage program transplantation technique for pro-
gram transformation. Given an entry point in the donor and a target implantation point in
the host program, the goal of automated program transplantation [105, 100, 159] is to iden-
tify and extract an organ, all code associated with the feature of interest, then transform it
to be compatible with the name space and context of its target site in the host. In this work,
we broaden program transplantation concept to intra-app transplantation that needs to deal
with the side-effect of the removal of the organ (compared to inter-app transplantation),
where effective heuristics are proposed to automatically identify the target implantation
point in the host program.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The increasing popularity of intelligent techniques such as machine learning intrigue se-
curity researchers and practitioners to adapt the intelligent techniques in security systems.
Investigating and strengthening the adversarial resiliency of the intelligent techniques are
crucial for such adaptation because these techniques were first proposed or developed with-
out considering the presence of adversaries. The contributions of this dissertation address
this issue from three perspectives. We first present how intelligent techniques can be adapted
for automated decision making in mobile security systems. Then we investigate the possibil-
ity to design and implement systematic attack strategies that are specifically adversarial to
these newly-proposed intelligent techniques. Last, based on the findings that the intelligent
techniques are indeed susceptible to the adversarial attacks, we develop techniques to fur-
ther strengthen the adversarial resiliency of intelligent techniques toward these adversarial
attacks.
One important direction for future research is to develop software engineering infras-
tructures including testing infrastructures to assure the quality of learning-based security
systems. The existing way to assure quality of a learning-based system is either by manual
testing (i.e., applying the learning-based system to several examples drawn from a test set
and measuring its accuracy) or by verification in a form of statistical guarantees (e.g., us-
ing statistical learning theory to suggest that the test error rate is unlikely to exceed some
threshold). For manual testing, the testing procedure cannot cover most (if not all) of the
possible – previously unseen – examples that may be misclassified. For verification, the
statistical guarantees are expressed for points that are drawn from the same distribution
as the training data (i.e., the guarantee will hold when considering only “naturally occur-
ring” inputs). While verification is challenging even from a theoretical point of view, even
automatic testing can be challenging from a practical point of view.
The traditional techniques of automatic testing cannot be applied on the learning-based
systems for three main reasons.
(1) Learning instead of implementing program logics. In traditional software,
test generation is driven by the goal of covering program structures (such as all program
branches/paths of a given program under test) because the logic of a traditional program is
expressed in terms of control flow statements. However, core logics of learning-based systems
are embedded in the machine learning models (i.e., arithmetic operations of formulas) in
the program. Even a single input can easily cover all program paths in a learning-based
system [160] because the learning-based system automatically learns its logic from a large
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amount of data with minimal human guidance (there is no need to incorporate any control-
flow statements in the program itself). Due to such unique characteristic, the erroneous
corner-case behaviors in learning-based systems are analogous to logic bugs in traditional
software.
(2) Non-linearity of machine learning models. Machine learning models are fun-
damentally different from the models (e.g., finite state machines) used for modeling and
testing traditional programs. Modern learning algorithms (e.g., perceptron learning, neural
network) tend to learn models that are highly non-linear functions. Finding inputs that can
result in high model coverage in these models is significantly more challenging due to the
non-linearity.
(3) Incapability of supporting techniques. The Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)
solvers [161] that have been quite successful at generating high-coverage test inputs for tradi-
tional software are known to have trouble with formulas involving floating-point arithmetic
and highly nonlinear constraints, which are commonly used in machine learning models.
Next we present our plans for possible future work that can be built upon our current
contributions and results.
Testing Metrics for Learning-based Mobile Security Systems. Testing metrics
are used to represent the effectiveness of test inputs. Higher values of testing metrics usu-
ally indicate better saturation of program logics in the system under test. As the values
of testing metrics increase, more issues lying in the system are likely to be uncovered. In
traditional software testing, various types of code coverage metrics, including line cover-
age, method coverage, and branch coverage, usually serve as the standard testing metrics
for evaluating different testing strategies. Testing metrics of traditional software are based
on program structures (e.g., statements, branches, and paths) because traditional software
incorporates program logics in these program structures (e.g., control flows, data flows).
However, program logics of learning-based systems are embedded in the arithmetic opera-
tions of formulas in the program. These facts make traditional testing metrics inappropriate
to characterize the executions of such mathematical formulas. For instance, sigmoid func-
tion, as a commonly-used activation function in neural networks, can be implemented with
only one line of Java code. When the function is used in neural networks, we need to observe
the return value (e.g., check whether the value is greater than a threshold) to tell whether
the respective neuron is activated or not. In other words, if we achieve full line coverage of
the method implementing a sigmoid function, we still could not guarantee that the status
space of the respective neuron has been fully covered. Thus, there is a strong need of testing
metrics customized for learning-based systems.
Recently, researchers developed a new systematic strategy [162] to test deep learning
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systems. They propose neuron coverage (i.e., ratio of the number of distinct activated
neurons to the total number of neurons in the neural network) as the testing metric. As
their approach tries to improve neuron coverage during testing of real deep learning models,
they find thousands of incorrect corner-case behaviors. The promising results show the
effectiveness of their approach as well as the future of such efforts. However, considering
only neuron coverage might not be sufficient for future improvements of the models under
test. There is one key problem in this testing metric: it interprets neuron activation as a
positive indicator for testing effectiveness, while actually it is only a status of the respective
neuron. Such situation is similar to counting the number of true clauses in traditional
software testing. A higher number of true clauses revealed during testing does not necessarily
imply covering more situations when executing the code. In fact, it is possible for faults to
be revealed even when most clauses are false. Such facts suggest that we should consider
more effective testing metrics for neural networks.
For our future work, we plan to use manifold to address the testing metric problem. A
manifold is a topological space, in which each point is surrounded by a locally Euclidean
space. Previous research [163] speculated that lower-dimension manifolds are good models for
many data-related tasks, whose data points might lie in very high-dimensional spaces. Such
speculation indicates that we might be able to tell whether specific inputs are meaningful or
not by checking whether they could fit in the manifold constructed from the training data.
There are multiple ways to construct manifolds from training data and check whether
specific inputs could fit in the manifolds. We plan to choose the most suitable combination
of approaches for each neural network model.
Manifold-reconstruction-based checking. The basic idea is to construct a new manifoldM′
with both training data and given input, and measure the distance between the new manifold
and the manifold M constructed from only training data, which is denoted as d(M,M′).
If inputs could fit in M, then the differences between M and M′ should be insignificant,
resulting in a small d(M,M′). If inputs are unlikely to be meaningful with regard to the
training data, it is expected to observe a somewhat differentM′, which corresponds to a big
d(M,M′). This approach should be applicable to all manifold learning algorithms.
Manifold-construction-invariant-based checking. Reconstructing the manifold and deriv-
ing the manifold-to-manifold distance might lead to efficiency problems. During manifold
construction, determined by the construction algorithm, some properties among the training
data might be fully or partially preserved (i.e., invariants), which could be utilized for faster
checking of new inputs. For instance, Isomap [164] preserves the geodesic distance between
each pair of points (i.e., the sum of edge lengths along the shortest path between two points).
This property entails that, if an input under test is together used with the training data to
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construct a manifold, the shortest Euclidean distance between the point corresponding to
the test input and the points representing the training data in the lower-dimensional space
will be the same as that in the higher-dimensional input space. Thus, if the distances of test
inputs to the manifold are used to judge whether those inputs fit in the manifold, we simply
need to find the shortest Euclidean distance between those inputs and training data in the
input space instead of constructing manifolds and measuring the distances among manifolds.
Autoencoder-based manifold construction and checking. Autoencoders are neural networks
with simpler hidden representations trained to forward inputs to outputs. Autoencoders can
be leveraged to identify intrinsic properties of the data [165] and realize both manifold
learning and checking. An autoencoder ae = d ◦ e can be viewed as two parts: an encoder
e : S→ H, which is trained to map from inputs to hidden representations, and resembles to
constructing the manifold from training data, and a decoder d : H→ S, which is trained to
recover inputs from hidden representations, and resembles to the reverse process of manifold
construction. The input space is denoted as S, the hidden representation space is denoted
as H, and H has fewer dimensions than S. Assume that H is large enough to embrace most
hidden representations of normal inputs, then the reconstruction error for training inputs
by ae, which can be defined as the average Euclidean distance from the outputs of ae to the
training inputs, should be reasonably low. This process resembles to normal inputs lying on
the manifold. For unintended inputs, since their hidden representations are likely to clash
with those of normal inputs due to limited space dimensions of H, and e tries to recover
from hidden representations based on training inputs, the outputs of e (also as the outputs
of ae) should be different from those inputs, resulting in high reconstruction errors. Such
process resembles to unintended inputs being away from the manifold. Such properties enable
unintended-input detection according to the reconstruction errors, essentially approximating
the distances between inputs and the manifold. Previous research [166] applied this technique
to defend against adversarial examples for neural network classifiers.
Test Oracle for Learning-based Mobile Security Systems. To test machine learn-
ing software, software testing techniques have been used to address two major issues: test
generation (i.e., generating test inputs) and test oracle (i.e., determining whether the soft-
ware behaviors are expected with respect to the given test inputs). Unexpected behaviors
of machine learning software can come from various causes such as not having good enough
training data sets, or the machine learning software itself is faulty. Here we are focusing on
the latter cause: test oracles to determine whether the machine learning software is faulty.
Machine learning software is known to suffer from the “no oracle problem” [167]. Usually
machine learning, especially supervised learning, learns a prediction model from training data
sets and then uses the prediction model to predict the label to classify a future data instance.
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A test oracle (what the prediction/label should be) is not easily obtainable. Labeling a
future data instance can also be done manually, yet being ineffective. Our previous work
on differential testing [168] focused on a similar problem. Differential testing is a testing
approach to generate test inputs that exhibit the behavioral differences between two versions
of a program. A specific implementation is chosen as a reference implementation, which can
be seen as a test oracle. By using another implementation of the same functionality as the
program that we want to test as a cross-reference test oracle, we can just use the output from
this another implementation as our expected output for a certain test input. Since machine
learning software is widely used nowadays, there are many machine learning frameworks
that have the same or similar functionality to each other. Thus, it can be very useful to
leverage multiple machine learning frameworks to help address the “no oracle problem” in
testing machine learning software.
We plan to tackle the test oracle problem for machine learning software by using an
approach of multiple-implementation testing for supervised learning software. The overall
idea is that we can collect multiple implementations of machine learning software that have
the same or similar functionality to the software that we want to test. It is likely that the
majority of these implementations produce the expected output for a given test input. Thus,
we can use the majority output from these implementations as our test oracle.
Going forward, the approaches that we have developed in this dissertation can be extended
to strengthen the adversarial resiliency for a much wider range of security systems. We hope
that by strengthening the adversarial resiliency of intelligent techniques, these approaches
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